Democratization and the diffusion of shari’a law: Comparative insights from Indonesia

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Abstract
The democratization of politics has been accompanied by a rise of Islamic laws in many Muslim-majority countries. Despite a growing interest in the phenomenon, the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries is rarely understood as a process that unfolds across space and time. Based on an original dataset established during years of field research in Indonesia, this article analyzes the spread of shari’a regulations across the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy since 1998. The article shows that shari’a regulations in Indonesia diffused unevenly across space and time. Explanations put forward in the literature on the diffusion of morality policies in other countries such as geographic proximity, institutions, intergovernmental relations and economic conditions did not explain the patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations in Indonesia well. Instead, shari’a regulations in Indonesia were most likely to spread across jurisdictions where local Islamist groups situated outside the party system had an established presence. In short, the Islamization of politics was highly contingent on local conditions. Future research will need to pay more attention to local Islamist activists and networks situated outside formal politics as potential causes for the diffusion of shari’a law in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

Keywords
Democratization, Indonesia, Islamic law, Islamization, policy diffusion, shari’a

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Introduction

As a result of the democratization of politics in many parts of the Muslim world, ‘elected governments face growing pressure to expand or preserve Islamic law’ (Kendhammer, 2013: 291). Consequently, the democratization of politics has been accompanied by the spread of Islamic law in many Muslim-majority countries (Kendhammer, 2013: 291; Riaz, 1985: 41–47; Villalon, 1994: 434; Yavuz, 1997: 63).

Most of the existing literature focuses on the consequences of the adoption of Islamic laws, including human rights, the treatment of women and religious minorities, as well as state-religion relations more broadly. In recent years, a smaller literature has emerged that examines the causes behind the adoption of Islamic law in the context of democratization. This article engages with the latter literature as we think it suffers from several shortcomings. Most important, the Islamization of politics implies a process that unfolds over time and across a democratizing country’s territory. However, despite a growing interest in the causes behind the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization, current scholarship neither understands the spread of shari’a law as a dynamic phenomenon nor does it explicitly address temporal and spatial issues. Most existing studies only show that the democratization of politics in Muslim-majority countries is often followed by an Islamization of politics.

Yet, studying the Islamization of politics’ temporal and spatial dimension is important for several reasons. Democratization is not unfolding in a unilinear fashion. Rather, it is a protracted process with frequent rollbacks and without a predefined outcome (Carothers, 2002: 5–21.) Since the Islamization of politics seems tied to the democratization of politics, it is highly likely that the Islamization of politics is an irregular process too. It is therefore crucial to understand what facilitates and obstructs the Islamization of politics over time.

It is important to also study the spatial dimension of the Islamization of politics for several reasons. Democratization is an uneven process even within nation-states as the growing literature on subnational authoritarianism shows (Gibson, 2005; Sidel, 2014). Furthermore, democratic transitions are often accompanied by a decentralization of political authority. This has created multi-level democratic systems with complex power dynamics across government layers, including many Muslim-majority countries (Riaz, 1985; Villalon, 1994; Yavuz, 1997).

In short, existing studies do not account for the possibility that the adoption of Islamic law may occur gradually over time and unevenly across a democratizing country’s territory. As the political landscape and institutional context in Muslim-majority countries become more heterogeneous as a result of democratization and decentralization, an explicit focus on the spread of Islamic law across time and space will therefore provide a more nuanced understanding of the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

The spread of shari’a regulations in Indonesia

To begin isolating factors that potentially facilitate or obstruct the spread of Islamic law across time and space in the context of democratization in Muslim-majority countries, we examined the adoption of shari’a regulations in Indonesia.

The collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998 abolished restrictions on party formation that Suharto had imposed during his reign. Now parties could be established freely,

1. See Kendhammer (2013) for an overview.
including parties with a religious platform. In addition, executive and legislative elections at both
the national and local level were introduced. Finally, the national government decentralized
political and fiscal authority to the subnational level. These reforms turned Indonesia not only into
the largest Muslim-majority democracy but also into one of the most decentralized countries in the
world.

While the national government theoretically retained authority over religious affairs under the
decentralization laws adopted in 1998, it also provided local governments with the authority to
amend national laws through local regulations.

Provincial and district governments have used their new powers to adopt local regulations
on a variety of moral and religious issues (Buehler, 2013, 2016; Bush, 2008; Lindsey, 2008). For
example, some of these local regulations prohibit alcohol consumption, gambling and
prostitution. Others regulate the collection of religious alms, Qur’an reading education and
female dress codes. Most scholars agree that the adoption of these shari’a regulations ‘clearly represents a historical breakthrough in the trajectory of political Islam in Indonesia’ (Hasan, 2007: 10).

While sensationalist accounts claimed that the more participatory political environment after
1998 had triggered a widespread ‘Islamization of politics’ and a ‘creeping shari’a-ization’ of the
archipelago (Anwar, 2003), more nuanced assessments suggest considerable temporal and spatial
variation in the adoption of these shari’a regulations. With regard to the temporal dimension, most
scholars have argued that the spread of these shari’a regulations is linked to Indonesia’s turbulent
transition period. Concretely, shari’a regulations were adopted in the context of political
instability, the breakdown of law and order and as a result of new players entering politics who
were eager to carve out a profile for themselves in a newly democratic political arena after 32 years
of military rule (Eddyono, 2011; Hakimul, 2011; Hefner, 2011; Van Bruinessen, 2013). Several
scholars claimed that the adoption of shari’a regulations slowed down as Indonesia’s democracy
became more consolidated (Bush, 2008; Makruf and Halimatussa’diyah, 2014). In short, the
adoption of shari’a regulations in Indonesia varied across time. Shari’a regulations were adopted
in rapid succession immediately after the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 but such
incidents became rare as Indonesia’s transition matured.

With regard to territorial variance in the adoption of shari’a regulations, several studies showed
that these regulations cluster in a small number of jurisdictions (Buehler, 2013; Bush, 2008). Concretely, 62 percent of all shari’a regulations that have been adopted since the 1998 cluster in
only six provinces. To provide another figure that shows the highly uneven adoption of these
regulations across space, 60 percent of all shari’a regulations are concentrated in only 23 percent
(115/497) of all Indonesian districts (Pisani and Buehler, n.d.).

While the Islamization of politics in Indonesia after 1998 seems to be characterized by con-
siderable temporal and spatial variance, none of the existing studies offer concrete insights into the
factors that potentially facilitate or obstruct the spread of shari’a regulations across time and space.
To better understand the temporal and spatial distribution of these shari’a regulations in Indonesia
after 1998, a more explicit focus on the conditions that potentially facilitate or obstruct the spread
of such shari’a regulations is necessary. In other words, most of the existing literature focuses on

2. Districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota) are situated below provinces in Indonesia’s adminis-
trative hierarchy. For brevity’s sake, we only refer to districts unless there are developments distinct to
municipalities.

3. For a more exhaustive list of these regulations, see Pisani and Buehler (n.d.).
the ‘who’ of Islamist politics, whereas the contribution of this article lies in its disaggregation and comparative analysis of the ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘when.”

Situating the diffusion of shari’a regulations in the theoretical literature

In this context, it is important to note that we are not interested in examining the adoption of shari’a regulations but the diffusion of such regulations across time and space. ‘Diffusion’ denotes the movement of a policy or a law from one jurisdiction to another. ‘Adoption’ means the enactment of a policy or a law in a specific jurisdiction (Karch, 2007: 56). In short, we study the interdependence between subnational polities with regard to the adoption of shari’a regulations to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which such regulations have spread in the context of democratization in Indonesia after 1998.

Hypotheses on the diffusion of morality policies

The literature on comparative public policymaking in general and the extensive literature on the diffusion of morality policies across the United States of America (USA) in particular provided a starting point for our own research (Graham et al., 2013; Mooney, 2000: 174).

Scholarship on the diffusion of morality policies across the USA has put forward competing explanations for the spread of such regulations. One of the earliest hypotheses claimed that geographic proximity facilitates the diffusion of morality policies. Polities that share boundaries with one another adopt similar policies because information flows easily between jurisdictions in close vicinity to one another. Furthermore, jurisdictions close to one another also often face similar political challenges and therefore adopt similar policies. Finally, jurisdictions sharing borders often adopt the same policies to prevent spill-over effects. For example, prostitutes (and their clients) may travel from jurisdictions that adopted harsh regulations against prostitution to jurisdictions with a less punitive legal environment. To prevent this, jurisdictions adjacent to early-adopters may follow suit and adopt similar policies.

Another set of studies from the USA argues that the institutional context determines the diffusion of morality policies. This literature’s main argument is that there are reformed and nonreformed jurisdictions. Reformed jurisdictions are districts that are ruled by district

4. We are not explicitly addressing ‘how’ shari’a regulations diffuse. Instead, we try to isolate broad patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations that may become the starting point for a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms and processes through which shari’a regulations diffuse. Subsequent research will have to identify the actual mechanisms and processes through which Islamic law spreads in the context of democratization in Indonesia and other democratizing Muslim-majority countries. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to be clearer on this point.

5. A similar logic is said to have led to a ‘race to the bottom’ in many American states with regard to social welfare policies. Fearful of attracting social welfare recipients from jurisdictions with lower quality social welfare regimes, many jurisdictions have cut back on social welfare provisions. In fact, US states have often pro-actively pushed citizens considered a burden to local welfare systems across state borders. The infamous ‘Greyhound therapy’ in Nevada is just one example. There, in an attempt to reduce health costs, mental health clinics were emptied in 2014 by sitting patients on an interstate Greyhound bus to California in the hope that the health system there would pick them up. Many of these patients became homeless in California instead. See Rather (2014).
managers rather than district heads. Such managers are appointed by local parliaments based on professional management credentials. In nonreformed jurisdictions, district heads are directly elected by the people. Furthermore, local parliaments in reformed jurisdictions are elected based on a proportional or ‘at large’ electoral system, rather than from single-member districts. The latter, ward-based elections are characteristic of unreformed jurisdictions (Sharp, 2005: 16).

How do these institutional differences matter for the diffusion of morality policies? In reformed jurisdictions, both executive governments and parliaments are somewhat isolated from public pressures. In nonreformed jurisdictions, in contrast, it is easier for popular demands to influence policymaking. In other words, the institutional framework lends itself to politicization given the presence of direct elections for executive government posts and ward-based elections for local parliamentarians. Politicians in such jurisdictions are vulnerable to machine politics based on clientelist relations, which works in favor of small but well-organized special interests, including conservative pressure groups.

Related to the literature that emphasizes the importance of institutions for the diffusion of morality policies are arguments that focus on intergovernmental relations as drivers of diffusion processes. Local jurisdictions are embedded in a complex institutional hierarchy. Hence, policy decisions at the subnational level are not made in isolation but often depend on rules and regulations issued by higher-level administrative layers. For example, if provinces (or states in the case of the USA) outlaw the possession of drug paraphernalia, it is challenging for districts located in such provinces to adopt policies on needle exchange programmes for drug addicts. In other words, morality policies against needle exchange programmes are more likely to spread to jurisdictions that are located in provinces which do not outlaw the possession of drug paraphernalia.

Furthermore, there are theories about the diffusion of morality policies that assign causal primacy to economic factors. For instance, morality policies against gambling are less likely to be adopted in jurisdictions that are in financial distress. There, economic pressures trump morality considerations. In prosperous communities, economic considerations are less likely to override morality concerns.

Finally, another strand of literature argues that local cultures define the diffusion of morality policies. Local policymakers are a product of the local culture they are embedded in. They are reflective of local values either because they have been socialized in the local communities whose politics they now shape or because they want to get re-elected and therefore adjust to the moral universe of their local communities. Morality policies are more likely to diffuse across jurisdictions with conservative local cultures than across jurisdictions with progressive local cultures.6

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6. There has been a long debate in political science on how to conceptualize culture. Numerous scholars have tried to identify local cultures across the USA, with varying degrees of success. For instance, Rosdil differentiates between conventional and unconventional jurisdictions in US local politics based on research that examines women’s social roles, the prevalence of tertiary education, the number of non-traditional households, including unrelated individuals living together, female-headed families and the prevalence of service-related employment in the local economy. Rosdil then argues that morality policies are more likely to spread across jurisdictions with conservative local cultures than with progressive local cultures. See Rosdil (1991).
Studying diffusion through comparing policy content

Most studies on the diffusion of policies focus on potential actors spreading a particular policy from one jurisdiction to another. However, such research is often conducted in consolidated democracies where the policymaking process is relatively well understood.

We considered it a more prudent approach to first isolate broad patterns in the spread of shari’a regulations by comparing the content of shari’a regulations across time and space. Such an approach has several advantages: Studying the diffusion of policies through a comparative content analysis is neglected in the existing literature (Graham et al., 2013: 17; Karch, 2007: 55). This often limits the insights into diffusion processes because studies that focus on actors rather than policy content often treat the spread of regulations as a process with a dichotomous outcome. Actors either adopt or do not adopt a specific policy in their respective jurisdiction. However, the diffusion process may be more nuanced. For instance, a jurisdiction may adopt a more stringent or more lenient version of a policy that already exists in another jurisdiction rather than just adopt or not adopt a policy. For democratizing Muslim-majority countries, this raises the question whether jurisdictions that adopt shari’a regulations relatively early in the democratization process adopt more comprehensive and harsher shari’a regulations than jurisdictions that are relative latecomers. In other words, is there a radicalization in the Islamization of politics over time or does the Islamization of politics peter out as democratization progresses? If there is no evolution in the content of shari’a regulations as they spread, does this indicate that the Islamization of politics is merely symbolic?

In short, tracking the diffusion of shari’a regulations through a comparison of their content provides insights into the scope of the Islamization process in the context of democratization that analyses with a focus on actors cannot provide.

We also compared the content of shari’a regulations because such content is relatively accessible compared to actors such as the local bureaucracies or Islamist networks through which the diffusion of shari’a regulations may occur.

We will elaborate briefly on the role of actors in the dissemination of shari’a regulations at the end of this article but want to focus on the role of actors mainly in future research and after the broad patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations are better understood.

The diffusion of shari’a regulations across Indonesia since 1998

To establish a dataset of shari’a regulations, we relied on the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), which, theoretically, has to keep tabs on all local regulations. To verify and complete the data obtained from the MoHA, we checked the website of every jurisdiction in Indonesia. Many jurisdictions publish online the local regulations they adopt. We also utilized existing compilations of shari’a regulations collected by watchdog organizations and journalists. In addition, we conducted in-depth research in national and local newspaper archives. Finally, we conducted numerous interviews with government officials, civil society organizations and Islamists on the ground in Indonesia between 2005 and 2014. If we were unable to obtain an actual hard- or soft-copy of the entire shari’a regulation, we did not include it in our list. This way, we established a list of 422 shari’a regulations, making it the most comprehensive data set on shari’a regulations in Indonesia currently available.⁷

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⁷ Previous studies have grossly underreported the number of shari’a regulations, estimating that there are only between 78 and 169 such regulations in Indonesia. See Bush (2008: 174–191) and Buehler (2013: 63–82) respectively.
For some local regulations it was not immediately clear whether they classify as shari’a regulations. For instance, should regulations against the consumption of alcohol be considered a shari’a regulation or a public health regulation? It is important to establish a clear classification for local regulations because morality laws may diffuse differently than health laws.\(^8\)

To address this issue, we looked at the content of the regulation and the justifications made therein as to why the regulation was deemed necessary by the local government that had adopted the regulation. For instance, if a district government prohibited the consumption of alcohol on religious grounds we considered it a shari’a regulation and included it in our dataset.

The data collection process also showed that there are different types of shari’a regulations. We found regulations on ‘public order and social problems’ such as alcohol consumption, gambling and prostitution. There are also regulations on ‘religious skills and obligations’ including Qur’an reading skills, prayer requirements or regulations that outline what constitute ‘proper’ Islamic beliefs. Finally, there are regulations that resemble not much more than ‘religious symbolism.’ These include dress codes for men and women (Salim, 2007: 126). Bush argued that the first kind of shari’a regulation should be categorized as ‘morality issues’ since they ‘reflect the moral teachings of most religions and the majority of Indonesian society’, while the second and third category are directly linked to the Qur’an and are therefore best categorized as regulations pertaining to ‘Islamic teachings’ (Bush, 2008: 177). We followed Bush’s categories in our article.

The diffusion of shari’a regulations across time and space

In order to show that the Islamization of politics through the adoption of shari’a regulations is a process that may vary across time and space, we first examined when and where shari’a regulations were adopted. Our data shows that shari’a regulations have spread relatively steadily between 1998 and 2013. If anything, their number has increased after 2005.\(^9\) This refutes claims made in previous studies mentioned above that the Islamization of politics in Indonesia is a transitional phenomenon confined to the years immediately following the collapse of the military regime in 1998.

The diffusion of shari’a regulations is also cyclical. Sixty-eight percent (287/422) of all shari’a regulations were adopted by local government heads during their first term in office, while only 30 percent (125/422) were adopted during local government heads’ second term in office.\(^10\) Indonesian law limits the time politicians can occupy governor or district head posts to two terms, each lasting five years. Arguably, local politicians lose interest in adopting such regulations when they no longer have to stand for re-elections.\(^11\)

With regard to the spatial dimension of the diffusion process, 62 percent of all shari’a regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 cluster in six provinces. These shari’a clusters are West Java (85), West Sumatra (55), South Kalimantan (38), East Java (32), South Sulawesi (26) and

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8. For a more extensive discussion on this issue, see Pisani and Buehler (n.d.).
9. This may have to do with the fact that direct elections for local government heads were introduced in 2005. For a detailed analysis, see Buehler (2016).
10. Seven shari’a regulations were adopted by caretakers that occupy office in between two elected district heads. Furthermore, in the case of three shari’a regulations, we could not establish whether they had been adopted in the first or second term as they did not include any date.
11. For a more in-depth analysis of how the adoption of shari’a regulations relates to election cycles, see Pisani and Buehler (n.d.).
It is also in these provinces where the first shari‘a regulations were adopted after the political opening in 1998. In other words, the number of shari‘a regulations adopted outside these shari‘a clusters was fairly low in the years immediately following the collapse of the New Order regime. Between 2004 and 2012 the number of shari‘a regulations adopted outside these shari‘a clusters increased.  

This indicates that shari‘a regulations have indeed diffused across the country in a gradual process. However, the majority of shari‘a regulations continue to be adopted in the six shari‘a clusters, as shown in Table 1. Overall, the diffusion of shari‘a regulations remains relatively confined. Most shari‘a regulations diffuse within the provinces in which they have been adopted first. In other words, they have not spiraled out across the archipelago in great numbers from the six shari‘a clusters.

To gain a better understanding for how these shari‘a regulations diffused, we then compared their content. A brief examination of the 422 shari‘a regulations provides a first impression of the spread of shari‘a regulations across the country between 1998 and 2013. The content of 60 percent (252/422) of all shari‘a regulations adopted between 1998 and 2013 is about ‘Islamic teachings’, while the remaining 40 percent (170/422) are concerned with ‘morality issues.’

Furthermore, of the 252 shari‘a regulations concerned with Islamic teachings, 25 percent (62/252) regulate the collection of religious alms (zakat), 23 percent (59/252) are concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills, 15 percent (39/252) are regulating Islamic micro-finance, 11 percent (27/252) establish rules to foster ‘proper faith’ and prohibit ‘Islamic sects’, 14 while 10 percent (25/252) of regulations are establishing dress codes for Muslims. Sixteen percent (40/252) of this type of shari‘a regulation deal with other issues pertaining to Islamic teachings.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Non-Shari‘a Clusters</th>
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12. For an analysis of the political dynamics in these shari‘a clusters, see Buehler (2013: 63–82).
13. There were no shari‘a regulations adopted outside the shari‘a clusters in 2013. It is not yet possible to say whether this is the start of a new trend, see Muhtada (2014).
14. Most of these regulations outlaw the practices of Ahmadiyah, a heterodox Islamic group.
A breakdown of shari‘a regulations concerned with morality issues shows that 51 percent (85/168) prohibit the consumption of alcohol, 29 percent (49/168) prohibit prostitution and 2 percent (4/168) prohibit gambling. The remaining 18 percent (30/168) of shari‘a regulations on ‘morality issues’ are relatively unspecific as they merely talk about encouraging ‘social order’ or prohibiting ‘sins’.

Overall, these descriptive statistics on the content of shari‘a regulations show that shari‘a regulations concerned with Islamic teachings have diffused relatively more easily than shari‘a regulations concerned with morality issues.

Based on this first finding about the distribution of shari‘a regulations, we decided to compare the content of the two groups of shari‘a regulations concerned with Islamic teachings that have been most widely adopted across jurisdictions, namely regulations on the collection of religious alms (zakat) and shari‘a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills. Such a focus was most likely to yield insights into the diffusion patterns of shari‘a regulations.

For logistical and financial reasons, we had to confine our content analysis to the shari‘a regulations in the districts of two provinces. We focused on West Java and West Sumatra provinces because the majority of shari‘a regulations on zakat collection and Islamic knowledge and skills were adopted in these two provinces. Concretely, of the 62 shari‘a regulations on zakat adopted between 1998 and 2013, 18 percent (11/62) were adopted in West Java and 13 percent (8/62) in West Sumatra, totalling more than 30 percent of all zakat regulations adopted nationwide. Likewise, 58 percent (34/59) of all shari‘a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills concentrate in these two provinces. Eighteen such regulations were adopted in West Java and 16 such regulations were adopted in West Sumatra. The distribution within these provinces is also considerable. In West Java and West Sumatra, zakat regulations exist in 42.3 percent and 41.1 percent of all jurisdictions respectively, while shari‘a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills exist in 30.5 percent of all districts in West Java and 42 percent of all districts in West Sumatra. More comprehensive data on the content of these shari‘a regulations are available in online appendices accompanying this article.15

**The diffusion of shari‘a regulations on zakat**

In West Java and West Sumatra, 19 zakat regulations were adopted between 1998 and 2013. We successfully obtained 10 such regulations in West Java and seven regulations in West Sumatra. Our content analysis revealed that the overall focus of these regulations on the collection of religious alms is similar across most jurisdictions in the two provinces. Most shari‘a regulations contain rules on the collection of religious alms and a list of what items are taxable under zakat law. Finally, almost all these zakat regulations contain instructions for establishing Government Zakat Collection Bodies (BAZ, Badan Amil Zakat) and Private Zakat Collection Bodies (LAZ, Lembaga Amil Zakat).

Furthermore, our analysis showed that the content of the shari‘a regulations on zakat in most jurisdictions in the two provinces was copied directly from the National Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management.16

15. The appendices are available at: www.michaelbuehler.asia
16. Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management was the first law adopted in post-1998 Indonesia that had an explicit religious focus.
However, our comparison also showed that many jurisdictions enriched paragraphs from the Law No. 38/1999. For instance, local shari’a regulations not only expanded the rules and regulations for the formation of BAZ and LAZ stipulated in Law No. 38/1999 but added new items on which zakat payments were required. Local jurisdictions also often changed the percentage figures for religious taxes. Some shari’a regulations also introduced new procedures for the collection of religious taxes.

Concretely, at least 17 of the 19 shari’a regulations introduced more stringent rules for the operation of local zakat collection agencies. They also ruled that local governments need to financially support the daily operations of the zakat collection agencies. There are no such stipulations in the Law No. 38/1999.

Most shari’a regulations on the collection of religious alms also introduced new oversight mechanisms for the operations of local zakat collection bodies. Law No. 38/1999 merely states that these collection bodies need to submit an accountability report to the parliament in their jurisdiction. Many local shari’a regulations revised this stipulation to the extent that accountability reports need to be submitted to parliaments and local executive governments.

Finally, many local shari’a regulations also introduced new sanctions for violating the rules and stipulations outlined in the regulations on the collection of zakat. For instance, most local shari’a regulations introduced significant higher prison sentences and monetary fines for transgressors compared to the national law.

In short, shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat became more comprehensive and more stringent during the diffusion process from the national to the subnational level.

However, the content of shari’a regulations on the collection of religious alms has not only diffused in a vertical fashion from the national to the local level. Our content analysis showed that the Islamization of politics also occurred along horizontal lines. Concretely, jurisdictions in both West Java and West Sumatra ‘borrowed’ paragraphs from one another, as shown in online appendix 1.

Finally, the enriched content of these local shari’a regulations subsequently spread to the national level. When the national government replaced Law No. 38/1999 with Law No. 23/2011 on Zakat Management, it introduced many of the more stringent provisions that had been introduced by local shari’a regulations on zakat adopted in previous years. For example, Article 30 of Law No. 23/2011 now states that the government is responsible for operational funding of the state-sponsored zakat body, now called BAZNAS. This was first mentioned in local shari’a regulations on zakat. The revised national law also introduced accountability mechanisms that drew on local shari’a regulations. For instance, Article 7, Paragraph 3 of Law No. 23/2011 requires the BAZNAS to deliver an annual report to both the President and the national parliament. Again, this has first been mentioned in local shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat. Sanctions for violating the new national law on Zakat Management have also been modeled after local shari’a regulations on zakat, which became harsher as these regulations diffused horizontally as mentioned before. This shows that the vertical diffusion of zakat regulations also occurred bottom-up.

To summarize, the diffusion of zakat regulations in Indonesia occurred both vertically and horizontally. Our comparison of the content of shari’a regulations on zakat showed that these regulations diffused vertically first. Subnational jurisdictions adopted such shari’a regulations only after Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management had been adopted. Subsequently, the content of

17. BAZNAS stands for Badan Amil Zakat Nasional and replaced BAZ, which stood for Badan Amil Zakat.
these regulations diffused horizontally. Many jurisdictions copied the exact wording from the district that had adopted shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat first. In the process of this horizontal diffusion, the content of these shari’a regulations on zakat often changed. Many zakat regulations that were adopted later on were more comprehensive and also more stringent than the zakat regulations that had been adopted in the years immediately after the fall of Suharto.

The diffusion of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills

Next we compared the content of shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills. Again, West Java and West Sumatra have the highest number of such shari’a regulations. We obtained 14 of these regulations in West Java and 11 such regulations in West Sumatra. The shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills in both provinces emphasized the need to increase religious instruction for pupils and students after 1998.

However, there were considerable differences between the two provinces with regard to the means through which such additional religious instruction should be provided. In West Java, 89 percent (16/18) of all shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills require pupils to attend private boarding schools, madrasah diniyah, for additional religious instruction. In West Sumatra, in contrast, 88 percent (14/16) of all shari’a regulations on Islamic teachings require students to improve their Islamic knowledge and skills through courses on Qur’an literacy that are offered as part of the official school curriculum. In other words, West Java’s jurisdictions almost exclusively require the provision of additional religious instruction through extra-curricular means while in West Sumatra, almost all shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills stipulate that additional religious instruction ought to occur as part of the official curriculum.

Furthermore, a comparison of the content of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills both within and across these two provinces showed that such shari’a regulations diffused mainly horizontally, that is within administrative layers. The first shari’a regulation on providing extracurricular religious instruction through madrasah diniyah was adopted in Indramayu district in 2003. Many districts in the province subsequently adopted similar shari’a regulations and ‘borrowed’ from this first shari’a regulation. Likewise, the shari’a regulations on improving Islamic knowledge and skills through increasing the hours of Qur’an reading at official schools spread horizontally across West Sumatra. The first such shari’a regulation was adopted in Solok district in 2001 from where it spread to other districts across the province in subsequent years. During this diffusion process, districts liberally borrowed paragraphs from the initial shari’a regulation in Solok district as shown in online appendix 2.

To summarize, there was no vertical diffusion in the case of shari’a regulations on Islamic teachings unlike during the diffusion of shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat. In other words, there was no national law that triggered the diffusion of this type of shari’a regulation at the subnational level. Shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills also did not travel upward from the local level to inspire national laws. In short, the diffusion of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills is highly confined by a specific local context. This was also shown by the fact that in West Java, almost all shari’a regulations pertaining to Islamic teachings were regulating religious instruction through madrasah diniyah. In contrast, in West Sumatra, shari’a

18. Only the provincial government in West Sumatra adopted one shari’a regulation on Islamic knowledge and skills in 2007.
regulations to improve pupils’ Islamic knowledge and skills aimed at doing so through additional Qur’an reading classes within the official school system.

Factors shaping the diffusion of shari’a regulations

What accounts for these patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations on zakat and Islamic knowledge and skills? Existing scholarship on the diffusion of morality policies suggested geographic proximity, the institutional framework, relations between administrative layers, economic conditions as well as local cultures as factors potentially shaping the diffusion of morality policies.

In Indonesia, geographical proximity does not seem to drive the diffusion of shari’a regulations, at least not beyond the provincial level. Most of the shari’a regulations adopted since 1998 cluster in six provinces as mentioned before. None of these provinces share boundaries with one another. Shari’a regulations also show considerable difficulties to spill over into provinces that do share borders with these shari’a clusters, as shown in Figure 1.

The fact that most districts in the six shari’a clusters have adopted at least one shari’a regulation between 1998 and 2013 suggests that geographical proximity plays a role in the diffusion of shari’a regulations within these clusters. However, this needs to be qualified. Most jurisdictions in each these shari’a clusters adopted a different ‘mix’ of shari’a regulations compared to neighboring districts. A few districts in the two provinces have adopted no shari’a regulations at all. Finally, we are aware of only one occasion during which local politicians were pondering the adoption of a shari’a regulation because of the existence of such a regulation in a neighboring district. In Pare Pare City in South Sulawesi province, the head of the local branch of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law (KPSSI, Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam), a conservative pressure group lobbying for a state based on Islamic law, argued in a hearing with the local parliament that Pare Pare City needed to outlaw the consumption of alcohol because, otherwise, hordes of ‘drinkers’ (peminum) from a nearby

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**Figure 1.** Number of shari’a regulations adopted in Indonesia at the provincial or district level between 1999 and 2012, by province. Source: Pisani and Buehler (n.d.).
district that had outlawed alcohol consumption would flock to Pare Pare City to drink liquor (Tribun Timur, 2009). 19

Arguments that institutional conditions determine the diffusion of morality policies also struggle to explain the shari‘a-ization of politics in Indonesia after 1998. In the USA, for instance, where most of the literature on the diffusion of morality policies comes from, federal structures provide local jurisdictions with considerable authority over the design of their local electoral and political institutions. Consequently, there are great institutional differences between reformed and non-reformed local jurisdictions. In contrast, Indonesia is a decentralized unitary state where the national government defines the boundaries of institutional changes at the local level. Hence, there are no institutional differences between Indonesian districts. The argument that morality policies diffuse more easily among non-reformed districts, that is jurisdictions with electoral institutions that facilitate the influence of groups situated in society, compared to reformed districts where the institutional environment confines the possibilities for societal groups to influence politics, does therefore not apply to Indonesia. In short, as there are no institutional differences between districts, institutional factors cannot account for why shari‘a policies diffuse among certain districts but not others.

In fact, in most Indonesian districts the institutional framework is underutilized from a shari‘a policy perspective. Shari‘a regulations have diffused to only a small number of districts despite the fact that the institutional framework would allow all jurisdictions in Indonesia to adopt such regulations. This provides further evidence that theories which emphasize the causal primacy of institutions in the diffusion of morality policies cannot explain the Indonesian case well.

Arguments that have been made in the literature on the diffusion of morality policies about how intergovernmental relations shape the diffusion of morality policies also do not travel easily to the Indonesian context. In the USA, for instance, morality policies seem to spread predominantly to local jurisdictions that are situated in states whose legal context is conducive to the causes pushed by morality policies. Such intergovernmental relations may explain some of the diffusion processes in Indonesia. The diffusion process of shari‘a regulations on zakat was clearly triggered by the adoption of Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management. 20 However, the legal framework of higher administrative layers in which districts are embedded is, again, underutilized by most local jurisdictions in Indonesia. In other words, many districts could adopt shari‘a regulations according to the provincial legal framework, yet have not adopted any shari‘a regulations. Concretely, only 12 percent (61/510) of all districts in Indonesia have adopted shari‘a regulations on the collection of zakat, despite the fact that the national law would allow all jurisdictions in Indonesia to adopt such regulations. If intergovernmental relations would play a decisive role in the diffusion of shari‘a regulations in the sense that it enables local jurisdictions to adopt such regulations, we would expect to see a diffusion of shari‘a regulations to a much higher number of districts.

Economic considerations also do not seem to play much of a role in the diffusion of shari‘a regulations. Theoretically, many shari‘a regulations provide local governments with opportunities

19. Arguably, geographical proximity does not facilitate the diffusion of shari‘a regulations because they are rarely implemented. Hence, politicians do not have to be concerned about potential spill-over effects even if neighboring districts adopt shari‘a regulations against prostitution or the consumption of alcohol. Subsequent research will need to examine such hypotheses through surveys and in-depth process tracing.

20. Likewise, shari‘a regulations prohibiting the religious practices of the Ahmadiyah only emerged after a national Joint Decree on Ahmadiyah was issued in 2008.
to generate additional income, ranging from tax revenues to the extortion of money from karaoke bars and nightclubs (Buehler, 2008). Poor jurisdictions would therefore be more likely to adopt shari’a regulations, according to our argument.

Yet, the economic conditions of jurisdictions that have adopted shari’a regulations differ considerably. For instance, West Java is relatively wealthy while West Sumatra is relatively poor. Yet both West Java and West Sumatra are provinces where shari’a regulations have come to cluster. Again, it is not the case that only jurisdictions in financial distress adopt shari’a regulations while jurisdictions that do well economically do not adopt such regulations. Economic conditions therefore struggle too to explain the diffusion of shari’a regulations in the archipelago.

Arguably, differences in local cultures explain best the diffusion patterns we identified. Most shari’a regulations were adopted in six provinces and mainly diffused within these six clusters. With the exception of East Java,21 in all other provinces local Islamist movements calling for a state based on Islamic law have existed for several decades (Buehler, 2013). Suppressed for most of the authoritarian New Order period, recent research showed that the democratization after 1998 has revived these local Islamist groups and allowed them to push for the adoption of Islamic law once more (Buehler, 2013). Locally rooted and parochial, these groups nevertheless frequently refer to other shari’a clusters when making claims for the necessity of shari’a regulations in their respective jurisdiction. For instance, the KPPSI, a conservative pressure group in South Sulawesi mentioned before, explicitly referred to the legal framework in Aceh province when it demanded in an open letter that local governments adopt Islamic law (KPPSI, 2005: 5).

In fact, patterns in the diffusion of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills identified above suggest that even within these clusters diffusion is shaped by local conditions. In West Java, shari’a regulations on Islamic teachings stipulated that additional religious instruction had to occur through madrasah diniyah. Such stipulations were absent in West Sumatra. There, local governments issued shari’a regulations that require students to improve their Islamic knowledge and skills by taking additional Qur’an reading classes offered as part of the official school curriculum. We believe that local cultural differences account for these differences.

The Dutch colonial administration tried to incorporate local education networks into the standard school curriculum through various rules and stipulations. However, Islamic schools located outside the colonial education system continued to grow in West Java and maintained their unique Islamic traditions (Steenbrink, 1974).

These madrasah diniyah, prevalent across West Java, are informal afternoon schools. Unlike a pesantren that is usually owned and controlled by a charismatic religious cleric (kyai), madrasah diniyah are managed by a committee of Islamic teachers recruited from village communities. Since these schools do not have paying students unlike pesantren, their financial situation depends mostly on voluntary donations (El-Saha, 2008). Across the province, there are also still many boarding schools that are rooted in the Guru Kula system. In this system, a religious teacher instructs a few students only, most of whom live in his home. He therefore depends on other sources of income to make a living. Additional sources of income often come from teaching at madrasah diniyah. In short, underfunded religious boarding schools situated outside the official education system form the backbone of the educational infrastructure in West Java.

Arguably, these local conditions have shaped the shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills that spread across West Java after 1998. All districts in West Java that adopted shari’a

21. For an account of why shari’a regulations have spread to East Java, see Turmudi (2004: 38–60).
regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills channel students towards the *madrasah diniyah* and promise financial support to the clerics administering these schools.

In West Sumatra, in contrast, Islamic schools have long tended to mix general education with religious study (El-Saha, 2008: 57–61.) Emblematic of this school type is *Madrasah Adabiyah*, which was founded in West Sumatra’s Padang Panjang by Abdullah Ahmad in 1907. In addition to teachings in Arabic and Islamic religious instruction, the school also offered courses in mathematics, as well as reading and writing training in the Latin alphabet (Steenbrink, 1974: 38–9). It was easier for the Dutch to incorporate these kinds of Islamic schools in West Sumatra into the official colonial education system. Consequently, private boarding schools situated outside official educational structures figure less prominently in West Sumatra’s political landscape today. Arguably, this explains why *shari’a* regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills adopted in West Sumatra after 1998 emphasize the importance of additional Qu’ran reading instruction within the official school curriculum. None of the *shari’a* regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills in West Sumatra refer to Islamic boarding schools situated outside the official education system.

In short, differences in the nature of the local Islamic education system in West Java and West Sumatra have facilitated the diffusion of certain types of *shari’a* regulations on Islamic teachings within these provinces but also prevented the diffusion of *shari’a* regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills to other provinces or an upward diffusion to the national level.

**Summary of findings and avenues for future research**

Our research suggests that examining the diffusion of *shari’a* regulations across time and space can contribute to a better understanding of the Islamization of politics in the context of democratization. We identified several patterns in the diffusion of *shari’a* regulations in Indonesia:

One, the diffusion of *shari’a* regulations in Indonesia after 1998 was steady but cyclical. This refutes claims that the spread of *shari’a* regulations in Indonesia was a transitional phenomenon.

Two, with regard to the diffusion across space, we showed that certain *shari’a* regulations diffused both vertically and horizontally. Other *shari’a* regulations diffused mainly horizontally. The fact that not all *shari’a* regulations spread in the same fashion suggests that the content of *shari’a* regulations shapes the diffusion process. Some issues seem to have relevance in certain localities only and therefore hardly spread beyond these localities as our comparison of *shari’a* regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills showed. *Shari’a* regulations with a more technical content, such as the regulations on *zakat*, diffused more easily both across and within government layers. In other words, the content of *shari’a* regulations can be an independent variable that shapes the outcome of the diffusion process as it influences which constituencies and organizations become involved in debates about specific *shari’a* regulations. Future research will have to examine how exactly the content of *shari’a* regulations shapes the Islamization of politics and identify the reasons for why certain *shari’a* regulations spread in a top-down manner while others seem to be almost exclusively local affairs.

Three, our research showed that the content of *shari’a* regulations can also be a dependent variable. In other words, rather than the content shaping the diffusion process, the diffusion process also shaped the content of *shari’a* regulations. For instance, many *shari’a* regulations on the collection of *zakat* we tracked became more comprehensive and more stringent over time. This shows, again, that the temporal dimension in the diffusion of *shari’a* regulations
deserves more attention because the timing seems to have an effect on the content of shari’a regulations. In fact, existing research on the diffusion of morality policies suggests that there is something ‘different about leaders, middle adopters and laggards, and perhaps about how policies spread across these temporally segmented sets of governments’ (Graham et al., 2013: 26). In the USA too, for instance, late adopters usually issue more comprehensive morality policies (Karch, 2007: 70).

Laggards may adopt more stringent shari’a regulations for various reasons. For example, looking at the adoption of policies and laws of early adopters, laggards are able to examine the public debate about the acceptability of certain policies and adjust their regulations accordingly. Future research needs to identify more specifically the reasons for why the content of the same type of shari’a regulation differs between early adopters and laggards.

Four, our research suggests that the adoption of shari’a regulations across space and time is contingent on local culture. Geographical proximity, institutional, intergovernmental, and economic explanations for the diffusion of morality policies seem to be, at best, necessary but not sufficient explanations for the diffusion of shari’a regulations in Indonesia. Instead, shari’a regulations spread mainly within provinces that have a long history of Islamist activists pushing for a state based on Islamic law. In addition, our comparison of the content of shari’a regulations showed that different kinds of shari’a regulations diffuse in different ways. Shari’a regulations concerned with Islamic knowledge and skills were different in West Java and in West Sumatra. In other words, local conditions also contained the diffusion of shari’a regulations on Islamic knowledge and skills beyond the respective province.

Future research will have to examine more in-depth what makes local cultures conducive to the spread of shari’a regulations and other morality policies. For instance, the important role historically entrenched local Islamist groups play in the diffusion of shari’a regulations in Indonesia raises the question whether such groups simply aggregate the interests and aspirations of the local population or whether these groups are somewhat more isolated within local society.22

In other words, while conservative Islamist pressure groups have a well established presence in all clusters to which shari’a regulations mainly diffused, little is known about whether such groups reflect popular opinion.23 Future research needs to examine the relationship between such groups and the general public and how this relationship shapes the diffusion of Islamic law.

In this context, it is also important to examine in future research whether local culture shapes the diffusion of the adoption of shari’a regulations in different ways than the diffusion of the implementation of shari’a regulations. The following anecdote shows the

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22. Recent research suggests that many of these shari’a regulations are adopted despite a lack of popular demand. In fact, the adoption of certain shari’a regulations diminished incumbents’ chances to get re-elected. See Pisani and Buehler (n.d.). Why this is the case needs to be addressed in future research. It may be that the majority of citizens do not dare to speak out against such shari’a regulations as they fear to be seen as ‘bad Muslims.’ They may therefore openly support such regulations while in private (or in secret during the electoral process) rejecting such shari’a regulations. On ‘preference falsification’ and its political consequences, see Kuran (1997).

23. Mooney showed for the USA that the homogeneity of an electorate influences the probability of morality policies being adopted or rejected. See Mooney (2000: 179).
importance of differentiating between the two. After Indonesian media reported that the implementation of shari’a regulation on the collection of zakat was mainly targeting local bureaucrats, there were several jurisdictions in which local bureaucrats began to push back after their local governments began to actually implement shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat. In Bulukumba and East Lombok district, for instance, thousands of schoolteachers protested against salary cuts based on local shari’a regulations on the collection of zakat (Suaedy, 2007; Wikileaks, 2009). In both jurisdictions, the district heads had to promise not to collect zakat from local bureaucrats to appease the situation. In Pangkep district, also in South Sulawesi province, the district head referred to the demonstrations in Bulukumba a few years later when he announced plans to adopt a shari’a regulation on zakat. He reiterated on several occasions in the local press that the salaries of bureaucrats would not be cut. Bulukumba, Pangkep and East Lombok district, like many other jurisdictions in Indonesia, now have shari’a regulations on the books that are not enforced due to public resistance. This not only shows the merely symbolic character of many of these shari’a regulations but also that different dynamics may be at play in the diffusion of the adoption of shari’a regulations and the diffusion of the implementation of shari’a regulations in Islamic countries in the context of democratization. Future research will have to examine why the adoption of shari’a regulations spreads relatively easily compared to the implementation of such regulations. In addition, research on the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries needs to examine whether the implementation of shari’a regulations in one jurisdiction facilitates or prevents the implementation in another jurisdiction.

Finally, future research on the diffusion of Islamic law will have to go beyond a focus on the content of such shari’a regulations and examine the actors involved in the diffusion process. In light of our findings about the importance of local cultural contexts, such a focus on actors ought not to follow rational choice theory but understand actors as political players who face ‘cognitive and normative pressures to conform to cultural rules, norms and expectations’ (Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005: 191).

Our findings corroborate existing research on the Islamization of politics in Indonesia that showed how local Islamist groups in a small number of provinces are putting pressure on local governments to adopt shari’a regulations (Buehler, 2013, 2016). However, these groups are too fragmented, parochial and locally defined to establish structures across jurisdictions. It is therefore unlikely that they shape the interdependence between districts when it comes to policymaking. Hence, more information is needed on whether there are interest associations whose apparatus

24. The weak Indonesian state does not have the capacity to collect taxes from most of its citizens. Only around 10 percent of Indonesians pay taxes. Consequently, most local governments have resorted to targeting bureaucrats. They are an easy target for tax collection because their salaries are controlled by the state. Governments have resorted to simply cutting bureaucrats’ salaries by the amount they are supposed to pay according to the respective shari’a regulation on zakat.

25. Of course, local elites are not only at the receiving end but may actively approach Islamist groups and networks. On how Islamic educational networks are used by elites for political ends in Indonesia, see Brewis (2009).
spans across jurisdictions and administrative layers and what role they play in the actual diffusion of Islamic law (Balla, 2001).  

A potentially important organization in Indonesia in this respect is the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia). The MUI was established during the authoritarian New Order period in 1975 by President Suharto to foster closer relations with the emerging Islamic community (ummah). The democratization of Indonesian politics after 1998 has allowed the MUI not only to redefine its role – it now officially serves the ummah rather than the government – but also to become more directly involved in politics. In past years, the MUI has become a crucial player in local discourses on morality and religious orthodoxy, and has played a vital role in formulating national policies such as the law against pornography or the ban on the Ahmadiyah community, a heterodox Islamic group (Ichwan, 2013).  

Despite MUI’s repositioning, it remains a semi-governmental organization with a centralized bureaucracy, with branches in almost every jurisdiction across Indonesia and considerable financial strength, mainly due to state funding (Hasyim, 2013: 42–55).  

In recent years, the MUI has used its institutional capacity to organize numerous workshops, study tours and knowledge exchange seminars. It has also published ‘best practice’ guides and organized speaker tours for district heads who had pioneered the adoption of shari’a regulations in their respective jurisdictions. Arguably, it is through the channels of organizations such as the MUI that shari’a regulations have spread between jurisdictions where local politicians were under pressure from local Islamist groups and therefore receptive to the Islamization of politics practiced in other jurisdictions (Hasyim, 2013: 63). In the context of most Islamist groups being locally confined, the vertical networks of national organizations such as the MUI and the role they play in the top-down dissemination of shari’a laws adopted at the national level need to be studied further. Future research in Indonesia and other democratizing Muslim-majority countries needs to examine more in-depth the role of such epistemic communities in linking jurisdictions across which shari’a regulations have diffused. Studying the role of academics, lobbying groups but also diasporas and the mass media seems particularly important (Graham et. al., 2013: 12–14).  

Arguably, the MUI also plays a more important role in the Islamization of politics in Indonesia than Islamist parties. Indonesia’s Islamist parties are poorly consolidated and lack grassroots networks on the ground. Their agenda has also become more moderate as a consequence of

26. In South Sulawesi, the KPPSI as well as networks of local Muhammadiyah branches organized knowledge exchange seminars and workshops on shari’a regulations. Often, local MUI branches were waiting for the national headquarters to approve their decisions, raising the question about the role national level political actors play in the diffusion of shari’a regulations. On the MUI as a crucial actor in the diffusion process, see Alamsyah (n.d.: 12–32); Ruddy (2005: 27); Suaedy (2007: 205).

27. For instance, the MUI organized a talk for a politician from Sukabumi district to brief his colleagues in Cianjur district on the shari’a economy in Sukabumi (Ruddy, 2005: 85–88).

28. For some initial findings, see Hasyim (2013: 156). On the importance of the vertical nature of ‘go-between’ organizations for the diffusion of policies, see Graham et al. (2013: 20–21). Certain shari’a regulations exist only at the provincial level, as is the case in Gorontalo. However, this is a rare exception and needs further investigation.

29. A comparison between MUI and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) may yield important insights. ALEC is a non-profit organization that drafts and shares model legislations among conservative local governments across the USA. See www.alec.org for more information. For a critical assessment of ALEC, see www.alecexposed.org
electoral pressures (Buehler, 2012). This is also the case in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries. Not all Islamist parties have grown out of social movements but are cadre parties. Many Islamist parties therefore do not command over broad networks on the ground. Likewise, many Islamist parties abandon their *shari’a* agenda as they become enmeshed in the compromise-laden business of government. In other words, as most Islamist parties are subject to moderation after becoming more formally included in politics such parties are arguably unlikely to be the main driver behind the diffusion of Islamic laws a few years into the democratization process. In light of these findings, future research needs to look more critically at whether Islamist parties really play such a central role in the Islamization of politics in democratizing Muslim-majority countries.

**Conclusion**

The political influence of Islamist activists is likely to grow in the context of democratization in Muslim-majority countries. However, the Islamization of politics in new Muslim-majority democracies is poorly understood. Most important, the Islamization of politics is rarely explicitly examined as a process with a spatial and temporal dimension.

In this article, we began isolating conditions that potentially facilitate or contain the Islamization of politics. We did so by comparing *shari’a* regulations that have been adopted in different jurisdictions after Indonesia became a democracy in 1998. Our content-tracing showed that the diffusion of these *shari’a* regulations is a highly dynamic process that unfolds unevenly across time and space. We argued that the variance behind the diffusion of *shari’a* regulations is contingent on local factors and that competing explanations such as economic deprivation or institutional conditions do not explain the patterns we isolated equally well.

In addition to showing a need to analyze the content of Islamic laws across time and space in other democratizing Muslim-majority countries to better understand the diffusion of such regulations, our article also called for a focus on the actors involved in the diffusion of Islamic laws. We believe that the MUI, a semi-government organization, is one of the main drivers of the Islamization of politics in Indonesia. This suggests that future studies need to consider a broader range of potential explanations for why the democratization of Muslim-majority countries often triggers an Islamization of politics. The current scholarly debate is dominated by a focus on Islamist parties and how they shape national politics. However, our research not only showed that there can be considerable subnational variance in the Islamization of politics but also that local conditions, especially a history of Islamist activism, may play an important role in shaping the diffusion of Islamic laws. Finally, semi-governmental organizations that command over a relatively well-financed bureaucratic apparatus that stretches across jurisdictions may play a more important role in the Islamization of politics compared to Islamist parties. The Indonesian case can therefore shed light on other Muslim-majority countries emerging from an authoritarian past and in which Islamic sentiment may not only be highly fragmented and poorly organized but also weakly institutionalized and lacking in resources.

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