

Local elite reconfiguration in post-New Order Indonesia: the 2005 election of district government heads in South Sulawesi

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In recent years, the initial enthusiasm for decentralisation and its ‘democratising’ impact on entrenched political elites in Indonesia has been replaced by increasingly gloomy evaluations of the country’s devolution process. A growing number of both academic and donor accounts now tell the story of how the mode of state power that was established under the authoritarian government of Suharto continues despite the demise of the New Order regime and the institutional reforms that followed. In other words, despite the introduction of free and fair elections and the devolution of political authority, ‘old elites’ maintained their strategic administrative and political positions at the national, provincial, and local levels (Hadiz and Robison 2004:29). In this article, I argue that, while ‘old elites’ indeed remain in power, the new institutional environment has reshuffled the cards for political elites. A more pluralist view than the one stressing continuity above all is thus needed.

Institutional changes

Indonesian politics have been shaped by two main developments since 1998. Firstly, there has been a more democratic spirit in government after forty years of autocratic rule. Secondly, Indonesia has embarked on a far-reaching decentralisation process of its political institutions that shifted most of the political power to the districts (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*keotamadya*), leaving the centre — and even more so the provinces — with fewer political and economic responsibilities.

The decentralisation law (*Undang-Undang 32/2004*) was formulated ambiguously and this resulted in an unclear distribution of

responsibilities between levels of government (Atje and Gaduh 2004:9; Kaiser and Hofman 2002:5, Jacobsen 2004:384). At the same time, the decentralisation law drastically cut the oversight power of the local parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD), over the local executive. In short, while attempts to reinstate accountability between levels got blurred, accountability between the legislative and the executive at the *kabupaten* level was crippled.

In addition to regulating responsibilities between different levels of government, the decentralisation law outlined new institutional procedures for the direct election of local government heads, *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung* or *Pilkada* for short. As the law outlined, regents (*bupati*) and mayors (*walikota*) were to be elected directly by the people for the first time in 2005. In these elections, candidates had to be nominated by parties that had received 15 per cent of the votes or 15 per cent of the seats in local parliaments, either alone or in a coalition, in the last legislative elections in 2004.² Against the backdrop of the strengthened position of the local executive towards other government layers and its increased political responsibilities and budget authority, it is no surprise that the 2005 *Pilkada* attracted considerable attention from local politicians. *Pilkada* thus provides a good opportunity for studying interest group realignments in post-New Order Indonesia.

This paper will show that despite the continued dominance of the entrenched political class, only candidates with strong personal networks at the sub-district (*kecamatan*) level had a reasonable chance of winning in the direct elections. Formerly dominant party machines, on the other hand, seem to be disintegrating. Research in two districts in South Sulawesi supports these arguments and matches experience in other districts of South Sulawesi, as well as other provinces in Indonesia. The 2005 *Pilkada* outcomes, then, do not reflect the mere continuation of the New Order *status quo* in Indonesian local politics.

***Pilkada* in South Sulawesi**

Pilkada were held in 10 of the 23 *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi province on 27 June, 2005. Ambiguous legal guidelines and a short

preparation phase led to various administrative and logistical problems before and during the elections. These problems were not unique to South Sulawesi and arose in other provinces as well (Cetro 2005; NDI 2005). *Pilkada* in South Sulawesi province were generally regarded as reasonably free and fair, though some reports of vote rigging in certain *kabupaten* exist (LKPMP 2005). In some *kabupaten*, supporters of unsuccessful candidates staged protests and demonstrations, but these usually died down within a few days (Mietzner 2006a). The voter turnout in South Sulawesi province was 69.8 per cent, which corresponded well with the national average voter turnout of 69 per cent (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005). Incumbents successfully defended their positions in five of the ten *kabupaten* in South Sulawesi province. In four *kabupaten*, incumbents were not re-elected. In one *kabupaten*, the incumbent was prohibited from running for office again, as he had already served two terms as *bupati*. Candidates nominated by Golkar, the strongest party in the province in past general legislative elections (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004), lost in 50 per cent of the districts in which *Pilkada* were held.

An analysis of the candidates' sociological profiles shows that an overwhelming majority of those who ran for office in *Pilkada* in South Sulawesi province were bureaucrats, politicians, party officials, former members of the military or the police force during the New Order. This finding supports recent research on Indonesian political elites at both the national and local level that stress the endurance of 'old elites' in the political arenas of post-Suharto Indonesia (Hadiz and Robison 2004; Mietzner 2006a; Takashi 2003). However, *Pilkada* triggered fierce intra-elite competition, as shown by the fact that many of the incumbents in South Sulawesi province were not re-elected.³ The *classe politique* of South Sulawesi province can thus hardly be treated as a unitary actor. In the following comparison of *kabupaten* Pangkajene dan Kepulauan and *kabupaten* Soppeng, two rural districts in South Sulawesi province, the individual candidates themselves are therefore at the center of analysis. Knowledge of the candidates' backgrounds is crucial to understanding their positions in the power dynamics that unfolded during *Pilkada*.

Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (Pangkep)

In *kabupaten* Pangkep, a district in the southwest of the province, in which most of the population is working in agricultural or the fishing industry, three pairs of candidates competed for the position of regent and vice-regent.

Syafruddin Nur, the eventual winner of *Pilkada*, has been a bureaucrat for the better part of his professional career, starting in the district administration of *kabupaten* Pangkep in 1990. Most importantly, he was the head of the Department for Public Works from 1992 until 2001. From 2002 onwards, he worked in the administration of Makassar, again in the development sector as Development and Economics Assistant. Andi Kemal Burhanuddin, Syafruddin Nur's running mate, was a long-standing local politician who held various positions within the Golkar party of *kabupaten* Pangkep. From 1999 to 2004, he was the Head of the Golkar party in the district (KPU Pangkep 2005a; Hanafi pers. comm. 13 March 2006) In *Pilkada*, Nur and Burhanuddin were nominated by Golkar, PAN, and PKS (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Gafar Patappe, was *bupati* of Pangkep from 1999 to 2004. A bureaucrat for his entire life, Patappe held various positions in the administration of *kabupaten* Pangkep from 1965 to 1985 before subsequently working in the administrative apparatus of the city of Makassar and in different positions in the provincial administration from 1985 to 1999. Patappe's running mate, Effendi Kasmin, worked in bureaucratic positions since 1984, mainly at the sub-district and district level (KPU Pangkep 2005a). In *Pilkada*, the pair ran on a coalition ticket consisting of small parties such as PBR, Partai Merdeka, PPK, PPNU, PDIP, Partai Demokrat, PBS, PIB, PKPI, PKBP, Partai Pelopor, and PPDI (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Taufik Fachruddin, the third candidate who competed for the position of *bupati* in *kabupaten* Pangkep, is a businessman who held executive positions in Makassar-based companies for almost 20 years. Fachruddin was by far the richest candidate who ran for office in *Pilkada* in Pangkep (KPU Pangkep 2005b).⁴ For the elections, Fachruddin teamed up with Andi Ilyas Mangewa, a bureaucrat who

had worked in sub-district positions since 1985 (KPUD Pangkep 2005a). PPP nominated the pair (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

In the years prior to *Pilkada*, Nur had already positioned himself as a clear frontrunner for these local elections. In 1999, when regents were elected via the DPRD, Nur lost against Patappe. After his defeat, Nur immediately started to campaign intensively for the 2005 *bupati* elections at the sub-district level. He visited popular roadside restaurants, attended local weddings and funerals, organised social events for the public, and courted the imams by donating money or building material for their mosques. He also held open debates with religious leaders in various villages⁵ and organized recreational events for the people in *kabupaten* Pangkep.⁶ Just before *Pilkada*, Nur accelerated the pace of his informal campaign and visited the villages and hamlets of the *kabupaten* together with his *tim sukses* (campaign team) on a daily basis. Urdin, the head of Nur's *tim sukses*, stated in an interview that he and Nur spent four to five days per week together in the villages in the 16 months prior to *Pilkada* (Urdin pers.comm. 14 March 2006).

Nur also went to great lengths to unite the Golkar party behind him before the 2005 local elections. According to regulations adopted in 1999, bureaucrats in Indonesia were prohibited from being party members. Consequently, Nur had had to leave Golkar that year. A potential rival for Nur in any upcoming election was therefore the head of the Golkar party in Pangkep, which was the strongest party in the district (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). As a result, Nur installed his own man, Syamsuddin, as the head of the local Golkar party in 2004 under the condition that Syamsuddin would not run for the *bupati* post in the 2005 and 2010 *Pilkada* respectively, as several interviewees mentioned. Nur also maintained close relations with the party after 1999,⁷ which culminated in Nur choosing the former Head of Golkar Pangkep, Kasmin, as his running mate for 2005 *Pilkada*. In this way, Nur firmly positioned himself with regard to his personal network, as well as with the strongest party in the district, well ahead of *Pilkada*.

Many parties approached Nur prior to *Pilkada*, eager to nominate this clear frontrunner. Nur chose two more parties to be in his coalition, PAN and PKS, despite the fact that the Golkar party

nomination would have been sufficient to reach the mandatory 15 per cent threshold mentioned above (Nur pers.comm. 9 March 2006). In addition to his strong personal network and the support of relatively well-organised and integrated parties, Nur successfully united a considerable share of the local business community behind him, most of which were from the contracting industry. An analysis of the composition of his campaign team shows that more than 10 per cent of the registered contractors in *kabupaten* Pangkep, officially joined Nur's *tim sukses* (Gapensi 2006; KPUD Pangkep 2005c).⁸ Nur also revived his close links to the provincial level. The governor, eager to expand his own footing in the districts of South Sulawesi with regard to the upcoming 2007 direct gubernatorial elections generously supported Nur's political ambitions, according to several interviewees. Finally, Nur appointed close relatives of the electoral commission members to important positions in his campaign team, thereby ensuring good links to the supposedly neutral commission, a body which is important not only in accrediting the nominations of prospective candidates prior to *Pilkada*, but is also the sole implementing agency for all stages of the elections, including the counting of votes and announcements of the winners.⁹ Having already campaigned at the sub-district level for years before *Pilkada*, Nur did not have to campaign during the official campaign period to a great extent. According to his own accounts, Nur spent US\$180,000 for his official campaign, an amount considerably lower than the ones mentioned by his competitors (Nur pers. comm. 9 March 2006).

Unlike Nur, Patappe, the incumbent, did not visit the villages and hamlets of *kabupaten* Pangkep very extensively. According to Patappe, he did not campaign at the sub-district level because his position as a *bupati* did not provide him with sufficient time to do so (Patappe pers. comm. 20 March 2006). According to a civil society organisation monitoring *Pilkada* in *kabupaten* Pangkep, Patappe did not campaign at the sub-district level because he thought that simply being the incumbent would provide him enough coverage and political support to win (Salma pers. comm. 4 February 2006). During the official campaign period, however, Patappe too visited villages and

hamlets, directed his campaign team to lobby for his cause, and organized festivities for the masses (KPUD 2005d).

With Golkar under the firm control of his rival, Patappe had to look for other parties that would nominate him. According to Patappe, this was a difficult process (Patappe pers. comm. 20 March 2006). With no other major party at his disposal, Patappe had to gather a coalition of 12 parties. Most of them only had a few or no seats in the DPRD (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). This meant that these parties had very weak or non-existing party structures at the (sub-) district level. Furthermore, Patappe's position within the party coalition, which was formed adhoc prior to *Pilkada*, was rather weak since he had no prior relations to most of these parties, according to his own accounts (Patappe pers. comm. 20 March 2006). Like his main Rival Nur, Patappe did have good connections to certain parts of the business community, though, and close links to the electoral commission.¹⁰

Fachruddin, the third candidate in the race for the post of *bupati* of Pangkep, mostly lived and worked in Makassar and therefore had weak ties to the *kabupaten*. However, Fachruddin also tried to expand his rudimentary network in the district in the years prior to *Pilkada*. In his position as manager of an Indonesia-Japanese joint-venture company called Maruki, he tried to establish a political base in the sub-districts by employing hundreds of people from Pangkep in his company in Makassar. These employees were bussed in each day by the company even though there was an abundance of laborers already located in the provincial capital.

Though Fachruddin had relatively weak personal contacts in the district, he had a close personal history with the Golkar party until a few weeks before *Pilkada*. Besides his father, Ir Fachruddin, being a Golkar representative at the national parliament DPR-RI for more than 20 years during the New Order, Fachruddin himself repeatedly ran for political positions as a Golkar candidate, the last time being in the 2004 legislative elections for the provincial parliament.¹¹ That same year, Fachruddin tried to become the head of the Golkar party in *kabupaten* Pangkep, but lost against Syamsuddin, the candidate installed by Nur. Misjudging and overestimating his position within the Golkar party, Fachruddin believed the Golkar party would nominate him for

Pilkada. Fachruddin therefore waited for the ‘green light’ by the Golkar party until a few months before the elections (Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006; KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). As it turned out, Fachruddin’s name did not even appear in the Golkar internal convention during which the party chooses its nominee prior to *Pilkada*. (Hanafi pers.comm. 13 March 2006).¹²

Realising too late that Golkar would not nominate him, Fachruddin officially approached PPP only a few weeks before the official campaign period for *Pilkada* was to start (Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Meanwhile, PPP had already been successfully courted by another pair of prospective candidates. Mansur and Tualle were the official candidates of PPP Pangkep until March 2005 as party internal letters show (PPP 2005a). Intensive ‘lobbying’ of PPP officials at the sub-district, provincial, and national levels by Fachruddin, however, led to the party dropping the Mansur-Tualle nomination in favour of Fachruddin and his running mate.¹³ Since Fachruddin was named the official candidate of PPP only a few weeks before the official campaign period for *Pilkada* was to start, Fachruddin admitted to encountering severe difficulties in his attempts to unite PPP behind him (Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Since Fachruddin’s position within PPP was very weak, especially after long years with the Golkar party, many PPP members at the sub-district level broke away from Fachruddin and supported other candidates.

Due to the difficulties he had to overcome prior to *Pilkada*, Fachruddin did not start campaigning much at the sub-district level before the official campaign period. By his own accounts, he also had profound difficulties in merging his own personal network with the PPP network. Consequently, his *tim sukses* did not function well. Some of the members of his *tim sukses* that were PPP members, for example, would not support him and instead supported other candidates or they simply did not campaign on his behalf despite being paid to do so. According to Fachruddin’s own evaluation, this unfavourable constellation made his campaign not only very expensive, but also largely ineffective, a view that is shared by other observers of *Pilkada* in *kabupaten* Pangkep (Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006; Salma pers.comm. 4 February 2006).¹⁴

Pilkada results in Pangkep

Nur won *Pilkada* with 56.9 per cent of the total votes (Table 1). Patappe, the incumbent, who won the 1999 local elections via the DPRD, did not win a single sub-district, and neither did Fachruddin, the most affluent of all candidates. Only in *kecamatan* Ma'rang, where Patappe had worked as a sub-district head between 1966 and 1970 (KPUD 2005a) and where Patappe's wife was born, did he gather a number of votes that challenged Nur's dominance. Personal relations, or the lack thereof, to the sub-district level also had an affect on

	H A Gaffar Patappe and H Effendi Kasmin	H Syafruddin Nur and H A Kemal Burhanuddin	H M Taufik Fachruddin and H Andi Ilyas Mangewa	Informal
Pangkajene	3254	13409	3946	193
Minasate'ne	3102	9677	2300	180
Balocci	1887	4251	2006	128
Bungoro	4117	11466	3008	226
Labakkang	4449	14262	2929	256
Tondong Tallasa	1313	2509	1131	58
Ma'rang	6147	6546	2321	218
Segeri	4031	4640	949	146
Mandalle	2636	3135	705	55
Liukang Tupabiring	5845	8538	757	230
Liukang Kalmas	2000	3494	665	83
Liukang Tangaya	3040	4554	1060	126
Totals	41821	86481	21777	1899
Percentage of total votes	27.5	56.9	14.3	1.2

Total votes 151978

Source: KPUD Pangkep 2005f

Table 1. 2005 Pilkada voting in Pangkep
by pairs of candidates and kecamatan

Fachruddin's results. In none of the districts did he come close to challenging Nur's dominance, and he also lost against the incumbent Patappe in most of the *kecamatan*. This poor result reflects his rudimentary network in Pangkep. Fachruddin, however, did come in second in *kecamatan* Pangkajene and Balocci. This result might be due to two reasons: first, many of the employees working in the company managed by Fachruddin live in the two constituencies, according to several interviewees; second, Balocci is the sub-district where Tualle was born, the prospective PPP candidate until a few weeks before *Pilkada* mentioned above. According to Tualle's accounts, a considerable share of the electorate was unaware of the changes made by PPP regarding their nominee, thus voting for PPP, erroneously thinking they were voting for Tualle at the ballot box (Tualle pers. comm. 21 April 2006).

In summary, the election in *kabupaten* Pangkep was won by a political figure who had a firm footing at the sub-district level, which came as a result of years of campaigning in the hamlets and villages of the *kabupaten*. His strong personal network at the sub-district level was further supported by his success in imposing his personal agenda and political ambitions on the Golkar party, a relatively well organised and integrated party in *kabupaten* Pangkep. He also brought PAN and PKS on his side, two other reasonably consolidated parties whose party networks could potentially yield votes. Nur ran against an incumbent whose personal network was rather detached from the *kecamatan* level and who had only minor, ill-consolidated parties at his disposal, whose structures do not reach deeply into the sub-districts. In addition, Patappe only started to campaign at the sub-district level a few weeks prior to *Pilkada*, which inevitably hurt him at the polls. Finally, Fachruddin, who had lived and worked mainly in Makassar prior to the election, had only a rudimentary personal network in the hamlets and villages of the district and could thus not yield many votes. He was also prevented from using the apparatus of the party that nominated him for his own ends because of his weak position within the party itself.

Kabupaten Soppeng

In *kabupaten* Soppeng, whose socio-economic profile is similar to *kabupaten* Pangkep, a majority of the population is working in the

agricultural sector, four pairs of candidates competed for the position of regent and vice-regent. Again, a description of the candidates' sociological profiles is essential in order to understand the election results in the district.

The winning candidate Andi Soetomo was a bureaucrat who occupied various positions at the sub-district level such as village head, village official and sub-district head over the last 25 years (KPU Soppeng 2005a; KL2SS 2005). It was only in the few years prior to *Pilkada* that Soetomo worked as the head of the Public Office in the administration of South Sulawesi province (KL2SS 2005; Soetomo pers. comm. 24 March 2006). For *Pilkada*, Soetomo partnered with Saransi, another bureaucrat who was working at the district bureaucracy of Soppeng at the time, but had worked at the *kecamatan* level in 1987 and from 1995 to 1998 (KPU Soppeng 2005a). Five parties including Partai Merdeka, PSI, PPNUL, PAN, and Partai Demokrat nominated Soetomo and Saransi (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

The incumbent, Andi Harta Sanjaya, had been *bupati* from 1999 to 2005. Before that he had worked as a bureaucrat at the district level of Soppeng regency since the early 1990s. After becoming *bupati* in 1999, he subsequently became the head of the Golkar party in the district. Syarifuddin Rauf, who had been deputy regent from 1999 to 2005, was Harta Sanjaya's running mate again in 2005. Rauf was a bureaucrat who has worked mainly at the district level of Soppeng regency in various positions since 1980 (KPU Soppeng 2005a). The Golkar party nominated this pair to run in *Pilkada* (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

The third candidate Andi Munarfah, is a lecturer at Universitas Negeri Makassar. He teamed up with another academic, Andi Rizal Mappatunru, a lecturer at Universitas Republik Indonesia. Mappatunru is also member of the party board of PKS and deputy chair DPRD of *kabupaten* Soppeng (KPU Soppeng 2005a). The pair ran on a PKS and PDI-P ticket (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Finally, there was Bismirkin, a businessman who had been born in Soppeng but lived in Jakarta for his entire life (KPU Soppeng 2005a). Andi Burhanuddin joined Bismirkin to contest in

Pilkada. Burhanuddin worked as a bureaucrat in the administrations of several *kabupaten* of South Sulawesi province but never in Soppeng district itself (KPUD 2005a). Bismirkin and Burhanuddin gathered a coalition of eleven parties. The coalition included PDK, PBB, PIB, PNBK, PKPI, PKPB, PKB, PBR, Patriot Pancasila, PPP, and Partai Pelopor. (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004; KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Andi Soetomo's unique career path provided him with a very strong personal network at the sub-district level. In addition to his excellent personal contacts, he also extensively campaigned at the sub-district levels during the last few years before *Pilkada*. Like Nur in *kabupaten* Pangkep, Soetomo visited popular food stalls, attended weddings and funerals, and participated in religious ceremonies. He also visited different mosques each Friday during the last two years leading up to *Pilkada* during which he socialised with the people there (*Fajar* 8 June 2005) and financially supported the imams (Yunus pers. comm. 12 January 2006).

With much of the business community closely connected to the incumbent Harta Sanjaya, Soetomo had to rely on sponsors outside the *kabupaten* to finance the costs of his political ambitions. He found support in the *bupati* of *kabupaten* Enrekang, a close relative and major contractor in the region. According to several interviewees, including upper-level members of Soetomo's campaign team, Soetomo's close contacts to the governor of South Sulawesi, which were established during his years as a bureaucrat in the provincial administration, provided him with a further source of income (Lucky pers. comm. 30 March 2006; Salam Djalle pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Like Nur, the successful candidate in Pangkep, Soetomo also had close relationships to the KPUD in Soppeng.¹⁵

Though only minor parties with weak organisational structures nominated Soetomo, he was firmly rooted in the sub-district level because of his aforementioned career path. This provided him not only with an elaborate personal network but also allowed him to render the seemingly strong party machine of the rival candidate dysfunctional. As the composition of Soetomo's campaign team shows, many lower level Golkar members joined his campaign team (KPUD Soppeng 2005b), much to the chagrin of the vice-chairman of

the Golkar party in Soppeng, Nur, who lamented the disloyalty of his party members in an interview (Nur pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Rauf, the Golkar candidate for deputy regent, deplored that the Golkar elite could not prevent party members from turning towards other candidates (Rauf pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Soetomo's success in bringing sub-district actors from the Golkar party to his side seems to have been facilitated by his long-standing position at the lower rungs of the Golkar party in Soppeng in the years before he had to leave the party in 1999 due to his status as a bureaucrat.¹⁶ According to Soetomo, many lower-level Golkar members were also part of his extensive family in the hamlets and villages (Soetomo pers. comm. 24 March 2006). In short, while Harta Sanjaya, the head of Golkar in Soppeng regency and official Golkar nominee, controlled the top-layer of the Golkar party, the centripetal forces unleashed by Soetomo's strong personal network at the sub-district level lured many Golkar followers away. This prevented Harta Sanjaya from using the relatively consolidated Golkar structures to their maximum potential to mobilise voters.

Harta Sanjaya, the incumbent, was born into an aristocratic family in *kabupaten* Soppeng and thus had excellent contacts at the provincial and national levels. Furthermore, both the Golkar elite of *kabupaten* Soppeng was on Harta Sanjaya's side, as well as the upper level of the bureaucracy. Interestingly, Harta Sanjaya not only failed to impose discipline on the Golkar party and use its structures for his own ends, but he also could not match Soetomo's network at the sub-district level, despite being born in *kabupaten* Soppeng. An analysis of Harta Sanjaya's career path shows he never worked in sub-district positions similar to the ones of Soetomo nor did he campaign with the same intensity at the sub-district level as Soetomo. It was only a few weeks before *Pilkada* that Harta Sanjaya and his campaign team started to visit the villages (*Tribun Timur* 17 June 2005; Rauf pers. comm. 27 March 2006).

This should not belie the fact, however, that Harta Sanjaya was a widely known public figure in *kabupaten* Soppeng. In fact, the way he and his family, many of whom occupied strategic positions in the bureaucracy and in the legislative as soon as Harta Sanjaya came to

power in 1999, ran the district government for their own ends was frequently debated amongst the people and subject to newspaper coverage. Rumors about severe malpractices by Harta Sanjaya's family culminated when news broke a few months prior to *Pilkada* about the *bupati* and some of his family members being involved in fraudulent activities in a development project, which included a mark-up scam of US\$2.1 million, a crime for which Harta Sanjaya is currently facing trial (*Tribun Timur* 25 November 2005). These corruption allegations undoubtedly had an effect on Harta Sanjaya's election results.

Munarfah and his running mate Mappatunru were nominated by PKS and PDI-P, two relatively well-organised parties that were fairly rooted in the district (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). Since Mappatunru was one of the founders of the PKS branch in *kabupaten* Soppeng and currently acts as one of the party's board members, the position of Munarfah and Mappatunru within PKS at least seems to have been quite established. This was not the case, however, for the PDI-P party. It does not seem that the PDI-P party in *kabupaten* Soppeng supported their candidates beyond nominating them since the nomination only came after pressure from the former Governor of South Sulawesi, Palaguna, who is not only a long standing PDI-P member close to Megawati Sukarnoputri, the former president of Indonesia, but also the uncle of Munarfah. According to Munarfah, PDI-P refused to campaign for him and his running mate after the party officials learned that he was too poor to pay for their travel expenses and 'pocket money' (Munarfah pers. comm. 29 March 2006).

In addition to his lack of financial resources and his relatively weak position within his party coalition, Munarfah lacked a strong personal network in *kabupaten* Soppeng, as he primarily lived and worked in Makassar prior to *Pilkada*. Only his running mate, Mappatunru, had a rudimentary personal network to fall back upon as he was born in one of the sub-districts of *kabupaten* Soppeng. The lack of a personal network is also reflected in the composition of the pair's campaign team. In contrast to Soetomo, the successful candidate, whose top tier of the campaign team counted no less than 126 names, all with close connections to *kabupaten* Soppeng, Munarfah and Mappatunru only gathered seven people in their *tim sukses*, most of

them former students of theirs, some of whom had no bonds to *kabupaten* Soppeng whatsoever (KPUD 2005b; KPUD 2005c; Mappatunru pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Given this background, it is not surprising that Munarfah, 'did not campaign much' prior to 2005 *Pilkada* (Munarfah pers. comm. 29 March 2006).

Financial concerns of this sort were unknown to Bismirkin, who was by far the richest of all of the candidates in *kabupaten* Soppeng (*Tribun Timur* 13 June 2005). Bismirkin, a businessman, had lived and worked in Jakarta for most of his life. Since Bismirkin was virtually unknown in Soppeng prior to *Pilkada*, his personal network was very limited. He also lacked connections to the political establishment of *kabupaten* Soppeng. He bought together a coalition of eleven minor, cash-strapped parties that were only very weakly rooted in the district. Nine of the parties did not have a seat in the local DPRD (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004; KPUD Soppeng 2005d). In addition to a lack of personal links to the district, Bismirkin was thus unable to activate any party structures for his own campaign ends, which was reflected in the rather blunt way he campaigned. According to a member of the election monitoring commission in Soppeng, Bismirkin distributed motorbikes and televisions to people in the hopes of getting their votes during his short but intense campaign (Mallari pers. comm. 26 April 2006).

***Pilkada* results in Soppeng**

Soetomo won *Pilkada* with 40 per cent of the total votes (Table 2). Soetomo performed strongest in *kecamatan* Lalabata, the sub-district where he was born, followed by *kecamatan* Liliriaja, Lilirilau, and Ganra, all sub-districts where Soetomo worked as village head or sub-district head in the past.¹⁷ Harta Sanjaya, the incumbent who won elections in 1999 via the DPRD, only won two of the seven *kecamatan*, Mario Riwawo and Mario Riawa, two sub-districts where he has close personal relations.¹⁸ Munarfah obtained most of his votes in *kecamatan* Lilirilau, where he even beat the incumbent, Harta Sanjaya. Again, close personal relations might be the explanatory factor as Mappatunru, Munarfah's running mate, was born in *kecamatan* Lilirilau (Mappatunru pers. comm. 27 March 2006; KPUD Soppeng 2005a).

	Dr A Munarfah M, MS and Drs A Rizal Mappatunru, MSi	Drs H Andi Harta Sanjaya and Drs H Syarifuddin Rauf, SH	Drs H Andi Soetomo, MSi and Drs Andi Sarimin Saransi	Ir H Bismirkin Manrulu and H A Burhanuddin T, SH, MSi	Informal
Mario Riwawo	2306	12409	7743	2751	129
Liliriaja	2636	5566	9239	2669	96
Lilirilau	6000	5723	8550	2941	122
Lalabata	3496	7345	12880	844	108
Ganra	1108	1609	3808	399	21
Donri-Donri	1961	5489	5725	853	53
Mario Riawa	3297	7245	4989	1194	106
Totals	20804	45386	52934	11641	635
Percentage of total votes	15.8	34.5	40.3	8.9	0.5
Total votes	131400				

Source: KPUD Soppeng 2005e

*Table 2. 2005 Pilkada voting in Soppeng
by pairs of candidates and kecamatan*

Finally, Bismirkin, got a small 9 per cent of the total votes in *Pilkada* in Soppeng.

Like in *kabupaten* Pangkep, the candidates' personal networks at the sub-district level seems to have been the decisive factor in winning *Pilkada* in Soppeng. A seemingly dominant party machine was levered successfully by a figure with a strong personal base in his district, which was the result of two decades of work as a bureaucrat in sub-district positions and an intensive campaign in the villages and hamlets years before the official campaign was to start. The incumbent, though in firm control of the top layer of the strongest political party in the district, the bureaucracy, and large parts of the

business community, was ousted from power since his personal network did not reach as far down in the *kabupaten* as the network of his more successful competitor. Finally, similar to *kabupaten* Pangkep, an affluent businessman who ran for office had limited chances of winning the elections due to the lack of a personal political base at the sub-district level. The vast amounts of money he spent during his campaign did not translate into local votes.

Pilkada in Pangkep and Soppeng compared

An analysis of the sociological profiles of Syafruddin Nur and Andi Soetomo showed that both were well-grounded in their *kabupaten*. This allowed the two candidates to establish close-knit personal networks, which they capitalized on in *Pilkada*. Candidates that lacked such a popular base did not win *Pilkada* in the districts examined. The incumbents in both districts were somewhat detached from their constituency and mainly interacted with the upper level of the party structures, the bureaucracy, and the business community in their respective *kabupaten*. Likewise, the businessmen wealthy, but without a popular base at the sub-district level, stood little to no chance of winning these local elections, as the cases of Fachruddin in Pangkep and Bismirkin in Soppeng showed.

While being downward-oriented now seems to be a necessity for any successful candidate, the nature of the relations to the upper levels in the institutional hierarchies appears to be changing as well. The provincial level these days seems to act as more of a facilitator for candidates that derive their power from being rooted in their respective population rather than acting as a decisive factor in these local elections. This is contrasted to the New Order period in which the governor or the provincial level determined the *bupati* via the local parliament (DPRD). In other words, while the provincial political arena is used as an additional source of financial support by players from the local political arena, political forces at the provincial level do not seem to be able to actively shape district electoral outcomes any longer. In fact, political players at the provincial level seem to have become more downward-oriented themselves. They are now more eager to provide financial support to popular local figures at the

district level as these are figures whose personal networks will be much needed in future direct elections of provincial government heads. The current governor of South Sulawesi province, H M Amin Syam, is a striking example of provincial-level figures who have started to establish their own personal networks in the districts. Syam, who is running for the position of governor again (*Kompas* 17 December 2005), not only supported candidates in 2005 *Pilkada* in the districts, but soon after the district elections ended, he created an expert team (*tim ahli*) at the governor's office. The team consists of most of the candidates that finished second in 2005 *Pilkada* in South Sulawesi province.¹⁹ It is their extensive personal networks that Syam will rely on, in addition to the ones of the successful candidates he supported in *Pilkada*, to obtain votes in the 2007 gubernatorial elections.

While strong personal networks at the sub-district level seem have been crucial to win local elections, parties played only a minor role for a candidate's fate. As the elections in *kabupaten* Pangkep and Soppeng demonstrated, parties often could neither provide lower-level party structures to their nominees nor could they guarantee the delivery of votes. This not only holds true for small parties that are largely disintegrated and defunct in-between elections but also for seemingly well-integrated parties that received a considerable amount of votes in past elections. In *kabupaten* Pangkep, for example, PPP, the second largest party in the DPRD after the 2004 general election, could not prevent its sub-district constituents from supporting another candidate, as in the case of Fachruddin. Similarly, in *kabupaten* Soppeng, the leadership of the Golkar party, which was the strongest party in the DPRD after the 2004 election, could only watch as considerable parts of the party's sub-district levels broke away in favor of another candidate. Furthermore, as the case of Nur in Pangkep showed, even in cases where the candidate had united the party behind him, he did not have unrealistic hopes about the party's actual potential to mobilise voters. Nur, who was nominated by the Golkar party, by far the strongest party in the district according to results from the general election of 2004, nevertheless brought PAN and PKS into his coalition, despite the fact that he already reached the required 15 per cent threshold by being nominated by Golkar alone. The fact that Nur

formed more than a minimum winning coalition exemplifies that he had no false expectations regarding the voter mobilisation possible through the Golkar party. In short, for candidates that already have firm roots in their respective districts, strong parties may act as an additional source for yielding results. Weak parties do not necessarily prevent candidates from winning the elections.

Additionally, the election laws of 2004, which required candidates to be nominated by parties provided the latter with a strategic position from which to impose financial demands on the candidates, as noted already elsewhere (Hillman 2005).²⁰ As the example of Mansur and Tualle showed, prospective candidates without sufficient financial resources do not get nominated. However, the fact that certain candidates are prevented from running for office in *Pilkada* is the unintended consequence of the parties' financial demands rather than the result of a party strategy of any kind. In other words, as parties demand money from the prospective candidates, they act as early blockers or facilitators by default.

Overall, it is important to note that parties only played a minor role in shaping the outcome of *Pilkada* in the *kabupaten* examined in this paper and that they do not have much power to shape the local contests beyond skimming off candidates early on in the electoral process.

Finally, money was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for winning 2005 *Pilkada* in Pangkep and Soppeng. Running for the post of *bupati* is an extremely expensive undertaking. Being wealthy does not guarantee a win, however. Affluent candidates without a popular network in the sub-districts did not win *Pilkada*, such was the case of Fachruddin in Pangkep and Bismirkin in Soppeng. In other words, 'money politics' alone did not yield votes in the districts compared in this paper.

South Sulawesi and beyond

Many of the observations from the districts examined above find their equivalent in the wider political arena of South Sulawesi and other provinces of the archipelago. Studies on *Pilkada* 2005 in Batam (Choi 2005), Papua, North Sumatra, North Sulawesi (Mietzner 2006a, b, c, d)

and East Sumba (Vel 2005) provide examples and evidence that political figures who were known by the people at the local level successfully won 2005 *Pilkada*.

At the same time, seemingly powerful party machines were rendered dysfunctional by individuals with strong personal networks all over South Sulawesi. This is best shown by the fact that Golkar lost 50 per cent of the elections in South Sulawesi, a region that once was the party's stronghold in Indonesia (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004; KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005). Golkar's fate in 2005 *Pilkada* in the wider political arena of Indonesia provides further evidence of the disintegration of seemingly powerful party machines, as mentioned above. Many districts heads of the local Golkar party that were either unpopular, detached, or both from their districts' populations clung to their power position within the party and pressed for nomination, subsequently leading the party into defeat. According to a Golkar internal document from April 2006, the party lost 63 per cent of all *Pilkada* in Indonesia in 2005 and 50 per cent of *Pilkada* carried out in the first four months of 2006 in all of Indonesia (Golkar DPP 2006).

High-ranking Golkar officials at both the provincial and national levels stated in interviews that they were caught by surprise by the dynamics of *Pilkada* for which the party was apparently ill-prepared (Parenrengi pers. comm. 29 March 2006; Rulli pers. comm. 3 April 2006). According to Rulli, the Golkar party's deputy secretary general, the party missed the opportunity to nominate appropriate figures in many districts. This was seen as a consequence of the national Golkar party's loss of control over the nomination processes of its local party branches (Rulli pers. comm. 29 March 2006). How profoundly the dynamics created by *Pilkada* and described above have impacted on party machines, is shown by a statement by Sumarsono, the secretary general of the national Golkar party, made during an interview with a newspaper in March 2006 on the question of why Golkar continues to lose *Pilkada* in so many districts:

Why did they [the Golkar candidates] not succeed? Data from our evaluation shows that the candidates that won *Pilkada* are those that were known by the people. There were several candidates that didn't sell themselves properly. Therefore, it is not the party that is the

decisive factor in the victory of a candidate. This is a reason to nominate candidates from outside the party that can sell themselves ... Hence, there are about 6 to 7 people we evaluate. After this, the results are examined. Also the perception of Golkar in a region is examined in this survey. Are Golkar cadre better [perceived by the population] than figures from outside the party? If there is only a small difference in perceptions, we will go with our cadre. However, if there is a big difference, it is better to nominate a figure from outside the party. (translated from *Fajar* 31 March 2006).

In short, in many districts and provinces across Indonesia, the dynamics created by *Pilkada* have degraded the once dominant Golkar machine to court individuals with strong personal followings in their districts.

As a reaction to the new realities on the ground, the party publicly announced that the old days are over when Golkar party heads could expect to automatically be the Golkar candidate in upcoming elections (*Fajar* 31 March 2006). At the same time, the central party board in Jakarta is trying to regain control over the local nomination process of the party's candidates for upcoming *Pilkada*. In this vein, the central party board cut back the voting power of the district branches in the nomination process for *Pilkada* candidates from 65 per cent down to 20 per cent, as a comparison of the party's internal voting regulations before and after 2005 *Pilkada* shows (Golkar DPP 2005a:28 paragraph 1c; Golkar DPP 2005b:32, paragraph 5d). This change will allow the party to nominate figures with a popular base in their respective districts instead of detached local Golkar elites if there is need.

Finally, also in the wider context of South Sulawesi, money seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition to win *Pilkada*. As a comparison of data on the candidate's personal wealth with their respective election results shows, it was not the most affluent candidates that won 2005 *Pilkada* in most of the districts of South Sulawesi. While businessmen seem to be increasingly able to penetrate the nomination process for elections (Magenda 2005:75), they do not seem to be able — yet — to win these contests to a similar degree, often due to the lack of a firm rooting in the district in which they are running for office.

Conclusion

An analysis of the candidates' socio-economic backgrounds showed, that old elites that have their origins in the New Order period were able to maintain their power positions to a great extent. *Pilkada*, imposed new rules on these elites, however, and triggered fierce intra-elite competition at the local level. Some figures within these old elites were better positioned for the interest group realignments that unfolded during *Pilkada* in 2005, either because of their career background or their ability to anticipate the new dynamics created by direct elections and act accordingly.

In both districts examined above, it was political figures that were rooted in their districts that won. The fact that many of these candidates were successful in direct local elections but could not win elections via the local parliaments in 1999, is an indication that direct election of local government heads increasingly allows people from the lower rungs of the aforementioned old elite to ascend to power. Against this backdrop, it would be too simplistic to argue that the 2005 *Pilkada* outcomes reflect the mere continuation of the New Order *status quo* in Indonesian local politics. In many cases, *Pilkada* seems to have indeed brought government closer to the people.

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List of political parties mentioned

Golkar	Golongan Karya	
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional	National Mandate Party
	Partai Demokrat	Democratic Party
	Partai Pelopor	Vanguard Party
	Patriot Pancasila	Pancasila Patriot's Party
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang	Crescent Star Party
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi	Reform Star Party

PBSD	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat	Social Democrat Labour Party
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle
PIB	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru	New Indonesia Alliance Party
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	National Awakening Party
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	Concern for the Nation Functional Party
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan di Indonesia	Justice and Unity Party
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	Prosperous Justice Party
PM	Partai Merdeka	Freedom Party
PNBK	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan	Freedom Bull National Party
PPDI	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party
PPDK	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan	United Democratic Nationhood Party
PPNUI	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	United Development Party
PSI	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	Indonesian Unity Party

Notes

1. An initial version of this article was presented at a conference titled 'Local District Elections, Indonesia 2005: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis of the Process of Democratization and Localization in an Era of 'Gloablization'', May 17–18, 2006, NUS: Singapore. I would like to thank Professor John T. Sidel at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Dr Marcus Mietzner in Jakarta for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to the Dr Robert and Lina Thyll-Dürr Foundation and

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2. On 23 July 2007, the Constitutional Court overruled this article in the autonomy law, allowing candidates to run in local elections without a party nomination.
 3. In Indonesia overall, 40 per cent of the incumbents were not re-elected (Mietzner 2006a:18).
 4. The candidates provide information about their personal wealth to the KPUD. This self-reported data, however, may be incomplete or inaccurate and has thus to be analysed with caution.
 5. For example, Dermaga Maccini Baji Labakkang 14–15 August 2004; Laskar Muda Pendukung Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur (LMPS) 12 June 2004 Parang Luara; Laskar Muda Pendukung Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur (LMPS) 12 June 2004, Taraweang; Laskar Muda Pendukung Ir. H. Syafruddin Nur (LMPS) 20 June 2004 Panaikang.
 6. For example, Kelompok Pecinta Alam Tropica Kegiatan Bakti Sosial Masjid Darussalam Tompo Bulu 27 June 2004; Kelompok Pecinta Alam Tropica Kegiatan Cross Country and Games Parang Luara-Tompo Bulu 25–27 June 2004; ‘Race on the Beach’ 14–15 August 2004.
 7. For example, according to Paharuddin Nur, the Vice Chairman (*Wakil Ketua*) of the Golkar party Pangkep, Syafruddin Nur would pay the costs of the annual festivities to celebrate the founding of Golkar Pangkep or plane tickets for Golkar cadres for travels to Jakarta (Nur pers. comm. 14 March 2006).
 8. Nur’s close links to the contracting industry were apparently established during his time as the head of the Department for Public Works, a government department that carries out transportation and infrastructure work. This position arguably also allowed Nur to accumulate considerable personal wealth given the numerous opportunities for corruption in the infrastructure sector in Indonesia.
 9. Udir, the head of Nur’s campaign team, for example, is the owner of a contracting company and the older brother of Ratna Sari, a member of KPUD Pangkep.
 10. The head of KPUD Pangkep, Amir Anin, for example, was a long-standing business partner of Patappe. Anin, owning an electricity company, received many lucrative tenders during the time Patappe was governing such as the project to bring electricity to the islands of *kabupaten* Pangkep, according to several interviewees.

11. Fachruddin ran on a Golkar ticket in the 2004 general election for DPRD I in DP4 (Daerah Pemilihan-Wilayah 4) in South Sulawesi (Aidir pers. comm. 24 January 2006; Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006).
12. According to a Golkar member who followed the party internal convention, only Syafruddin Nur and Zaenal Abidin, the former regent of *kabupaten* Takalar, were proposed as candidates (Hanafi pers. comm. 13 March 2006).
13. In an interview, Fachruddin mentioned that he made several trips to the sub-district heads of PPP Pangkep, on whom a recommendation letter suggesting a prospective candidate to the party center in Jakarta depends. Fachruddin also met with party representatives at both the provincial and national levels (Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Meanwhile, Arfan Tualle, the candidate mentioned above, according to his own accounts, was asked USD \$25,000 by the heads of PPP from the party centre for being nominated. Tualle, who expanded the party base considerably in Pangkep in his function as head of the Board for the Good Order In the General Election in 2004, was disappointed that the party center still asked him for such a large sum of money despite him working for the party's cause for years (Tualle pers. comm. 22 April 2006).
14. Fachruddin stated that he spent 'much more' than USD \$200,000 on his official campaign alone (Fachruddin pers. comm. 14 March 2006).
15. Musa, the head of KPUD Soppeng, is Soetomo's second cousin (Soetomo pers. comm. 24 March 2006; Musa pers. comm. 16 March 2006).
16. In 1999, for example, Soetomo was the head of the Board for the Good Order In the General Election of the Golkar party Soppeng and 'pulled the strings' for the party at the sub-district level for the 2004 general election (Mallari pers. comm. 28 March 2006).
17. Soetomo worked as a village head in Ganra 1978-1985, as a sub-district head in Liliriaja from 1989 to 1995, and again as a sub-district head in Liliriau from 1995 to 1997 (Soetomo pers. comm. 24 March 2006; KPUD 2005a).
18. Harta Sanjaya was born in Mario Riawa and Harta Sanjaya's niece is married to the sub-district head of Mario Riawawo (Mallari pers. comm. 26 April 2006).
19. The governor's 'expert team' currently includes figures that lost 2005 *Pilkada* in *kabupaten* Selayar, Bulukumba, Maros, Luwu Utara Gowa and Soppeng (Rauf pers. comm. 27 March 2006).
20. According to my own interviews with candidates, party heads, DPRD members and KD representatives, a candidate faces costs of US\$100,000 to US\$300,000 for the party nomination alone. Again, based on personal

communications, a conservative estimate of the total costs a candidate in *Pilkada* faces (such as party nomination, campaigning, and reimbursement of *tim sukses*) is between US\$500,000 and US\$700,000. This is an average calculated from interview data in the resource-poor districts of South Sulawesi. The prices are undoubtedly much higher in resource-rich *kabupaten* where the return-on-investment, once a candidate is in office, is likely to be larger. Anecdotal evidence from East Kalimantan, for example, shows that candidates there face minimum costs of about US\$700,000. (*Pare Pos* 11 June 2005).

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