DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA?
Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)
THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL NETWORKS IN INDONESIAN LOCAL POLITICS
An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005

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In recent years, the initial enthusiasm for decentralization of political authority to the district level and its "democratizing" impact on entrenched political elites in Indonesia has been replaced by increasingly gloomy evaluations of the country's devolution process. A growing number of both academic and donor accounts now tell the story of how the mode of state power that was established under the authoritarian government of Soeharto continues despite the demise of the New Order regime and the institutional reforms that followed. In other words, despite the introduction of free and fair elections and the devolution of political authority, "old elites" maintained their strategic administrative and political positions at the national, provincial, and local levels (Hadiz and Robison 2004, p. 29). This chapter argues that while "old elites" indeed remain in power, the new institutional environment has reshuffled the cards for political elites. Personal networks at the local level have become more important in winning elections, while large party machines have become
a less decisive factor in shaping election outcomes. A more pluralist view than the one stressing continuity above all is thus needed.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

Indonesian politics have been shaped by two main developments since 1998. Firstly, there has been a more democratic spirit in government after forty years of autocratic rule. Secondly, starting with Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999, Indonesia embarked on a far-reaching decentralization process of its political institutions that shifted most of the political power to the districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kotamadya), leaving the centre — and even more so the provinces — with fewer political and economic responsibilities.

Even after the re-centralization attempts of Law No. 32/2004, local governments are still much stronger than prior to 1998. The ambiguous formulation of Law No. 32/2004 resulted in an unclear distribution of responsibilities between levels of government (Atje and Gaduh 2004, p. 9; Jacobsen 2004, p. 384; Kaiser and Hofman 2002, p. 5). At the same time, Law No. 32/2004 drastically cut the oversight power of the local assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD), over the local executive. In short, while attempts to reinstate vertical accountability did not successfully materialize, horizontal accountability between the legislative and the executive at the kabupaten level was crippled.

In addition to regulating responsibilities between different levels of government, Law No. 32/2004 outlined new institutional procedures for the direct election of local government heads, pemilihan kepala daerah langsung or pilkada for short. As the law outlined, regents (bupati) and mayors (walikota) were to be elected directly by the people for the first time in 2005. In these elections, candidates had to be nominated by parties that had received 15 per cent of the votes or 15 per cent of the seats in local assemblies, either alone or in a coalition, in the 2004 legislative elections. Against the backdrop of the strengthened position of the local executive towards other government levels and its increased political responsibilities and budget authority, it is no surprise that the 2005 pilkada attracted considerable attention from local politicians. Pilkada thus provide a good opportunity for studying interest group realignments in post-New Order Indonesia.

This chapter will show that, despite the continued dominance of the entrenched political class, only candidates with strong personal networks at the sub-district (kecamatan) level had a reasonable chance of winning in the
direct elections. Formerly dominant party machines, on the other hand, are disintegrating. Research in two districts in South Sulawesi supports these arguments and matches experience in other districts of South Sulawesi, as well as other provinces in Indonesia. The 2005 pilkada outcomes, then, do not reflect the mere continuation of the New Order status quo in Indonesian local politics.

**PILKADA IN SOUTH SULAWESI PROVINCE**

Pilkada were held in ten of the twenty-three kabupaten in South Sulawesi province on 27 June 2005. Ambiguous legal guidelines and a short preparation phase led to various administrative and logistical problems before and during the elections. These problems were not unique to South Sulawesi and also arose in other provinces (Cetro 2005; NDI 2005). Pilkada in South Sulawesi province were generally regarded as reasonably free and fair, though some reports of vote rigging in certain kabupaten exist (LKPMP 2005). In some kabupaten, supporters of unsuccessful candidates staged protests and demonstrations, but these usually died down within a few days (Mietzner 2006a). The voter turnout in South Sulawesi province was 69.8 per cent, which corresponded well with the national average voter turnout of 69 per cent (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005). Incumbents successfully defended their positions in five of the ten kabupaten in South Sulawesi province. In four kabupaten, incumbents were not re-elected. In one kabupaten, the incumbent was prohibited from running for office again, as he had already served two terms as local government head. Candidates nominated by Golkar, the strongest party in the province in past general legislative elections (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004), lost in 50 per cent of the districts in which pilkada were held.

An analysis of the candidates' sociological profiles shows that an overwhelming majority of those who ran for office in pilkada in South Sulawesi province were bureaucrats, politicians, party officials, former members of the military or the police force during the New Order. This finding supports recent research on Indonesian political elites at both the national and local level that stress the endurance of "old elites" in the political arenas of post-Soeharto Indonesia (Hadiz and Robison 2004; Mietzner 2006a; Takashi 2003). However, pilkada triggered fierce intra-elite competition, as shown by the fact that many of the incumbents in South Sulawesi province were not re-elected. The classe politique of South Sulawesi province can thus hardly be treated as a unitary actor. In the following comparison of kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (Pangkep) and kabupaten Soppeng, two rural districts in South Sulawesi province, the
individual candidates themselves are therefore at the centre of analysis. Knowledge of the candidates’ backgrounds is crucial to understanding their positions in the power dynamics that unfolded during the first direct elections of local government heads in Indonesia in 2005.

KABUPATEN PANGKAJENE DAN KEPULAUAN (PANGKEP)

In kabupaten Pangkep, a district in the southeast of the province, in which most of the population works in agriculture or the fishing industry, three pairs of candidates competed for the position of regent (bupati) and vice-regent (wakil bupati).

Syafuddin Nur, the eventual winner of the pilkada, has been a bureaucrat for the better part of his professional career, starting in the district administration of kabupaten Pangkep in 1990. Most importantly, he was the head of the Department for Public Works 1992–2001. From 2002 onwards, he worked in the administration of Makassar, again in the development sector as Development and Economics Assistant. Andi Kemal Burhanuddin, Syafuddin Nur’s running-mate, was a long-standing local politician who had held various positions within the Golkar party of kabupaten Pangkep. For example, he was the head of the Golkar party in the district 1999–2004 (Hanafi, pers. comm. 13 March 2006; KPUD Pangkep 2005a). Nur and Burhanuddin were nominated by Golkar, PAN, and PKS (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Gaffar Patappe was bupati of Pangkep from 1999–2004. A bureaucrat for his entire life, Patappe held various positions in the administration of kabupaten Pangkep 1965–85 before subsequently working in the administrative apparatus of the city of Makassar and in various positions in the provincial administration 1985–99. Patappe’s running-mate, Effendi Kasmin, worked in bureaucratic positions since 1984, mainly at the sub-district and district level (KPUD Pangkep 2005a). The pair ran on a coalition ticket consisting of small parties such as PBR, Partai Merdeka, PPDK, PPNUI, PDIP, Partai Demokrat, PBSD, PIB, PKPI, PKBP, Partai Pelopor, and PDDI (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

Taufik Fachruddin, the third candidate who competed for the position of district government head in kabupaten Pangkep, is a businessman who held executive positions in Makassar-based companies for almost 20 years. Fachruddin was by far the richest candidate who ran for office in Pangkep (KPUD Pangkep 2005b).4 For the elections, Fachruddin teamed up with Andi Ilyas Mangewa, a bureaucrat who had worked in sub-district positions since 1985 (KPUD Pangkep 2005a). PPP nominated the pair (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).
In the years prior to the pilkada, Nur had already positioned himself as a clear front-runner for these local elections. In 1999, when district government heads were elected via the DPRD, Nur lost against Patappe. After his defeat, Nur immediately started to campaign intensively for the 2005 bupati elections at the kecamatan level. He visited popular roadside restaurants, attended local weddings and funerals, organized social events for the public, and courted the imam by donating money or building material for their mosques. He also held open debates with religious leaders in various villages and organized recreational events for the people in kabupaten Pangkep. Just before the elections, Nur accelerated the pace of his informal campaign and visited the villages and hamlets of the kabupaten together with his tim sukses (campaign team) on a daily basis. Urdin, the head of Nur's tim sukses, stated in an interview that he and Nur spent four to five days per week together in the villages in the sixteen months prior to the pilkada (Urdin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

Nur also went to great lengths to unite the Golkar party behind him before the 2005 local elections. According to regulations adopted in 1999, bureaucrats in Indonesia were prohibited from being party members. Consequently, Nur had had to leave Golkar that year. A potential rival for Nur in any upcoming election was therefore the head of the Golkar party in Pangkep, which was the strongest party in the district (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). As a result, Nur installed his own man, Syamsuddin, as the head of the local Golkar party in 2004 under the condition that Syamsuddin would not run for the local government head post in the 2005 and 2010 pilkada, as several interviewees mentioned. Nur also maintained close relations with the party after 1999, which culminated in Nur choosing the former head of Golkar Pangkep, Kasmin, as his running-mate for the 2005 pilkada. In this way, Nur firmly positioned himself with regard to his personal network, as well as with the strongest party in the district, well ahead of the pilkada.

Many parties approached Nur prior to the pilkada, eager to nominate this clear front-runner. Nur chose two more parties to be in his coalition, PAN and PKS, despite the fact that the Golkar party nomination would have been sufficient to reach the mandatory 15 per cent threshold mentioned above (Nur pers. comm. 9 March 2006). In addition to his strong personal network and the support of relatively well-organized and integrated parties, Nur successfully united a considerable share of the local business community behind him, most of whom were from the contracting industry. An analysis of the composition of his campaign team shows that more than 10 per cent of the registered contractors in kabupaten Pangkep, officially joined Nur's tim sukses (Gapensi 2006; KPUD Pangkep 2005c). Nur also revived his close links to the provincial level. The governor, eager to expand his own
footing in the districts of South Sulawesi with regard to the upcoming 2007
direct gubernatorial elections, generously supported Nur's political ambitions,
according to several interviewees. Finally, Nur appointed close relatives of
the electoral commission members to important positions in his campaign
team, thereby ensuring good links to the supposedly neutral commission, a
body which is important not only in accrediting the nominations of
prospective candidates prior to the pilkada, but is also the sole implementing
agency for all stages of the elections, including the counting of votes and
announcement of the winners.\textsuperscript{9} Having already campaigned at the sub-
district level for years before the pilkada, Nur did not have to campaign
during the official campaign period to a great extent. According to his own
accounts, Nur spent US$180,000 for his official campaign, an amount
considerably lower than the ones mentioned by his competitors (Nur, pers.
comm. 9 March 2006).

Unlike Nur, Patappe, the incumbent, did not visit the villages and
hamlets of kabupaten Pangkep very extensively. According to Patappe, he did
not campaign at the sub-district level because his position as district head
did not provide him with sufficient time to do so (Patappe, pers. comm.
20 March 2006). According to a civil society organization monitoring pilkada
in kabupaten Pangkep, Patappe did not campaign at the sub-district level
because he thought that simply being the incumbent would provide him
enough coverage and political support to win (Salma, pers. comm. 4 February
2006). During the official campaign period, however, Patappe too visited
villages and hamlets, directed his campaign team to lobby for his cause, and
organized festivities for the masses (KPUD Pangkep 2005\textsuperscript{d}).

With Golkar under the firm control of his rival, Patappe had to look for
other parties that would nominate him. According to Patappe, this was a
difficult process (Patappe, pers. comm. 20 March 2006). With no other
major party at his disposal, Patappe had to gather a coalition of twelve parties.
Most of them only had a few or no seats in the DPRD (KPU Sulawesi Selatan
2004). This meant that these parties had very weak or non-existent party
structures at the sub-district level. Furthermore, Patappe's position within the
party coalition, which was formed \textit{ad hoc} prior to the pilkada, was rather
weak since he had no prior relations to most of these parties, according to his
own accounts (Patappe, pers. comm. 20 March 2006). Like his main rival
Nur, Patappe did have good connections to certain parts of the business
community, though, and close links to the electoral commission.\textsuperscript{10}

Fachruddin, the third candidate in the race for the post of bupati of
Pangkep, mostly lived and worked in Makassar and therefore had weak ties to
the kabupaten. However, Fachruddin also tried to expand his rudimentary
network in the district in the years prior to the pilkada. In his position as manager of an Indonesia-Japanese joint-venture company called Maruki, he tried to establish a political base in the sub-districts by employing hundreds of people from Pangkep in his company in Makassar. These employees were bussed in each day by the company even though there was an abundance of labourers already located in the provincial capital.

Though Fachruddin had relatively weak personal contacts in the district, he had a close personal history with the Golkar party until a few weeks before the pilkada. Besides his father, Ir. Fachruddin, being a Golkar representative in the National Assembly DPR-RI for more than 20 years during the New Order, Fachruddin himself repeatedly ran for political positions as a Golkar candidate, the last time being in the 2004 legislative elections for the provincial assembly. That same year, Fachruddin tried to become the head of the Golkar party in kabupaten Pangkep, but lost against Syamsuddin, the candidate installed by Nur. Misjudging and overestimating his position within the Golkar party, Fachruddin believed the Golkar party would nominate him for the pilkada. Fachruddin, therefore, waited for the “green light” by the Golkar party until a few months before the pilkada (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006; KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). As it turned out, Fachruddin’s name did not even appear in the Golkar internal convention during which the party chose its nominee prior to the pilkada (Hanafi, pers. comm. 13 March 2006).

Realizing too late that Golkar would not nominate him, Fachruddin officially approached PPP only a few weeks before the official campaign period for the pilkada was to start (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Meanwhile, PPP had already been successfully courted by another pair of prospective candidates. Mansur and Tualle were the official candidates of PPP Pangkep until March 2005 as party internal letters show (PPP 2005a). Intensive lobbying of PPP officials at the sub-district, provincial, and national levels by Fachruddin, however, led to the party dropping the Mansur-Tualle nomination in favour of Fachruddin and his running-mate. Since Fachruddin was named the official candidate of PPP only a few weeks before the official campaign period for the pilkada was to start, Fachruddin admitted to encountering severe difficulties in his attempts to unite PPP behind him (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Since Fachruddin’s position within PPP was very weak, especially after long years with the Golkar party, many PPP members at the kecamatan level broke away from Fachruddin and supported other candidates.

Due to the difficulties he had to overcome prior to the pilkada, Fachruddin did not start campaigning much at the sub-district level before the official
campaign period. By his own accounts, he also had profound difficulties in merging his own personal network with the PPP network. Consequently, his *tim sukses* did not function well. Some of the members of his *tim sukses* who were PPP members, for example, would not support him, and instead supported other candidates or simply did not campaign on his behalf despite being paid to do so. According to Fachruddin's own evaluation, this unfavourable constellation made his campaign not only very expensive, but also largely ineffective, a view shared by other observers of the *pilkada* in Pangkep regency (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006; Salma, pers. comm. 4 February 2006).14

**PILKADA RESULTS IN PANGKEP**

Nur won the *pilkada* with 58 per cent of the total votes (Table 5.1). Patappe, the incumbent, who won the 1999 local elections via the DPRD, did not win a single sub-district, and neither did Fachruddin, the most affluent of all candidates. Only in *kecamatan* Ma’rang, where Patappe had worked as a *camat* in 1966–70 (KPUD 2005a) and where Patappe’s wife was born, did he gather a number of votes that challenged Nur’s dominance. Personal relations, or the lack thereof, to the sub-district level also had an affect on Fachruddin’s results. In none of the districts did he come close to challenging Nur’s dominance, and he also lost against the incumbent Patappe in most of the sub-districts. This poor result reflects his rudimentary network in Pangkep. However, Fachruddin did come in second in *kecamatan* Pangkajene and Balocci. This result might be due to two reasons: First, many of the employees working in the company managed by Fachruddin live in the two constituencies, according to several interviewees. Second, Balocci is the sub-district where Tualle, the prospective PPP candidate until a few weeks before the elections as mentioned above was born. According to Tualle’s accounts, a considerable share of the electorate was unaware of the changes made by PPP regarding their nominee, thus voting for PPP, erroneously thinking they were voting for Tualle at the ballot box (Tualle, pers. comm. 21 April 2006).

In summary, the election in *kabupaten* Pangkep was won by a political figure who had a firm footing at the sub-district level, which came as a result of years of campaigning in the hamlets and villages of the *kabupaten*. His strong personal network at the sub-district level was further supported by his success in imposing his personal agenda and political ambitions on the Golkar party, a relatively well-organized and integrated party in *kabupaten* Pangkep. He also brought on his side PAN and PKS, two other reasonably consolidated parties whose party networks could potentially yield votes. Nur
TABLE 5.1
Pilkada Voting in Pangkep by Pairs of Candidates and Sub-district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HA Gaffar Patappe and H Effendi Kasmin</th>
<th>H Syafuddin Nur and HA Kermal Burhanuddin</th>
<th>HM Taufik Fachruddin and H Andi Ilyas Mangewa</th>
<th>Informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pangkajene</td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>13,409</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minasate'ne</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>9,677</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balocci</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungoro</td>
<td>4,117</td>
<td>11,466</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labakkang</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>14,262</td>
<td>2,929</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tondong Tallasa</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malang</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>6,546</td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segeri</td>
<td>4,031</td>
<td>4,640</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandalle</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liukang Tupabiring</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>8,538</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liukang Kalmas</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,494</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liukang Tangaya</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>4,554</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>41,821</td>
<td>86,481</td>
<td>21,777</td>
<td>1,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total votes</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td>151,978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: KPUD Pangkep 2005f.*

ran against an incumbent whose personal network was rather detached from the sub-district level and who had only minor, ill-consolidated parties at his disposal, whose structures did not reach deeply into the sub-districts. In addition, Patappe only started to campaign at the sub-district level a few weeks prior to the pilkada, which inevitably hurt him at the polls. Finally, Fachruddin, who had lived and worked mainly in Makassar prior to the election, had only a rudimentary personal network in the hamlets and villages of the district and could thus not yield many votes. He was also prevented from using the apparatus of the party that nominated him for his own ends because of his weak position within the party itself.

**KABUPATEN SOPPENG**

In kabupaten Soppeng, whose socio-economic profile is similar to kabupaten Pangkep, a majority of the population works in the agricultural sector. Four pairs of candidates competed for the position of district government head and
deputy district government head. Again, a description of the candidates' sociological profiles is essential in order to understand the pilkada outcome.

The winning candidate Andi Soetomo was a bureaucrat who occupied various positions at the sub-district level such as village head, village official and sub-district head over the last twenty-five years (KL2SS 2005; KPUD Soppeng 2005a). It was only in the few years prior to the pilkada that Soetomo worked as the head of the Public Works Office in the administration of South Sulawesi province (KL2SS; Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2005). For the district government head elections, Soetomo partnered with Saransi, another bureaucrat who was working in the district bureaucracy of Soppeng at the time, but had worked at the kecamatan level in 1987 and 1995–98 (KPUD Soppeng 2005a). Five parties — Partai Merdeka, PSI, PPNUI, PAN, and Partai Demokrat nominated Soetomo and Saransi (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

The incumbent, Andi Harta Sanjaya, had been bupati in the 1999–2005 period. Before that he had worked as a bureaucrat at the district level of Soppeng regency since the early 1990s. After becoming the district government head in 1999, he subsequently became the head of the Golkar party in the district. Syarifuddin Rauf, who had been deputy bupati from 1999–2005, was Harta Sanjaya’s running-mate again in 2005. Rauf was a bureaucrat who had worked mainly at the district level of Soppeng regency in various positions since 1980 (KPUD Soppeng 2005a). The Golkar party nominated this pair to run in the pilkada (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005).

The third candidate, Andi Munarfah, is a lecturer at Universitas Negeri Makassar. He teamed up with another academic, Andi Rizal Mappatunru, a lecturer at Universitas Republik Indonesia. Mappatunru is also a member of the board of PKS and deputy chair of the local assembly (DPRD) of kabupaten Soppeng (KPUD Soppeng 2005a). The pair ran on a PKS and PDI-P ticket (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2005). Finally, there was Bismirkin, a businessman who had been born in Soppeng but lived in Jakarta for his entire life (KPUD Soppeng 2005a). Andi Burhanuddin joined Bismirkin to contest in the local elections. Burhanuddin had worked as a bureaucrat in the administrations of several kabupaten of South Sulawesi province but never in Soppeng district itself (KPUD 2005a). Bismirkin and Burhanuddin gathered a coalition of eleven parties: PDK, PBB, PIB, PNBK, PKPI, PKPB, PKB, PBR, Partai Patriot Pancasila, PPP, and Partai Pelopor (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004, 2005).

Andi Soetomo’s unique career path provided him with a very strong personal network at the sub-district level. In addition to his excellent personal contacts, he also extensively campaigned at the sub-district levels during the
last few years before the elections. Like Nur in kabupaten Pangkep, Soetomo visited popular food stalls, attended weddings and funerals, and participated in religious ceremonies. He also visited different mosques each Friday during the last two years leading up to the pilkada during which he socialized with the people there (Fajar 8 June 2005) and financially supported the imam (Yinus, pers. comm. 12 January 2006).

With much of the business community closely connected to the incumbent Harta Sanjaya, Soetomo had to rely on sponsors outside the kabupaten to finance his political ambitions. He found support in the district government head of kabupaten Enrekang, a close relative and major contractor in the region. According to several interviewees, including upper-level members of Soetomo’s campaign team, Soetomo’s close contacts with the governor of South Sulawesi province, which were established during his years as a bureaucrat in the provincial administration, provided him with a further source of funds (Lucky, pers. comm. 30 March 2006; Salam Djalle, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Like Nur, the successful candidate in Pangkep, Soetomo also had close relationships to the KPUD in Soppeng.15

Though only minor parties with weak organizational structures nominated Soetomo, he was firmly rooted in the sub-district level because of his aforementioned career path. This provided him not only with an elaborate personal network, but also allowed him to render the seemingly strong party machine of the rival candidate dysfunctional. As the composition of Soetomo’s campaign team shows, many lower-level Golkar members joined his campaign team (KPUD Soppeng 2005b), much to the chagrin of the vice-chairman of the Golkar party in Soppeng, Nur, who lamented the disloyalty of his party members in an interview (Nur, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Rauf, the Golkar candidate for deputy bupati, deplored that the Golkar elite could not prevent party members from turning towards other candidates (Rauf, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Soetomo’s success in bringing sub-district actors from the Golkar party to his side seems to have been facilitated by his long-standing position in the lower rungs of the Golkar party in Soppeng in the years before he had to leave the party in 1999 due to his status as a bureaucrat.16 According to Soetomo, many lower-level Golkar members were also part of his extended family in the hamlets and villages (Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2006). In short, while Harta Sanjaya, the head of Golkar kabupaten Soppeng and official Golkar nominee, controlled the top level of the Golkar party, the centripetal forces unleashed by Soetomo’s strong personal network at the sub-district level lured many Golkar followers away. This prevented Harta Sanjaya from using the relatively consolidated Golkar structures to their maximum potential to mobilize voters.
Harta Sanjaya, the incumbent, was born into an aristocratic family in kabupaten Soppeng and thus had excellent contacts at the provincial and national levels. Furthermore, both the Golkar elite of kabupaten Soppeng, as well as the upper level of the bureaucracy were on Harta Sanjaya’s side. Interestingly, Harta Sanjaya not only failed to impose discipline on the Golkar party and use its structures for his own ends, but he also could not match Soetomo’s network at the sub-district level, despite being born in kabupaten Soppeng. An analysis of Harta Sanjaya’s career path shows he never worked in sub-district positions similar to the ones of Soetomo nor did he campaign with the same intensity as Soetomo at the sub-district level. It was only a few weeks before the pilkada that Harta Sanjaya and his campaign team started to visit the villages (Tribun Timur, 17 June 2005; Rauf, pers. comm. 27 March 2006).

This should not belie the fact, however, that Harta Sanjaya was a widely known public figure in kabupaten Soppeng. The way he and his family, many of whom occupied strategic positions in the bureaucracy and in the legislature as soon as Harta Sanjaya came to power in 1999, ran the district government for their own ends was frequently debated amongst the people and subject to newspaper coverage. Rumours about severe malpractices by Harta Sanjaya’s family culminated when news broke a few months prior to the elections about the bupati and some of his family members being involved in fraudulent activities in a development project; these included a mark-up scam of US$2.1 million, a crime for which Harta Sanjaya is currently facing trial (Tribun Timur 25 November 2005). These corruption allegations undoubtedly had an effect on Harta Sanjaya’s election results.

Munarfa and his running-mate Mappatunru were nominated by PKS and PDI-P, two relatively well-organized parties that were fairly well rooted in the district (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004). Since Mappatunru was one of the founders of the PKS branch in kabupaten Soppeng and currently acts as one of the party’s board members, the position of Munarfa and Mappatunru within PKS seems to have been quite established. However, this was not the case for the PDI-P party. It seems that the PDI-P party in kabupaten Soppeng did not support their candidates beyond nominating them since the nomination only came after pressure from the former Governor of South Sulawesi province, Palaguna, who is not only a long-standing PDI-P member close to Megawati Sukarnoputri but also the uncle of Munarfa. According to Munarfa, PDI-P refused to campaign for him and his running-mate after the party officials learned that he was too poor to pay for their travel expenses and “pocket money” (Munarfa, pers. comm. 29 March 2006).

In addition to his lack of financial resources and his relatively weak position within his party coalition, Munarfa lacked a strong personal network
in kabupaten Soppeng, as he primarily lived and worked in Makassar prior to the pilkada. Only his running-mate, Mappatunru, had a rudimentary personal network to fall back upon as he was born in one of the sub-districts of kabupaten Soppeng. The lack of a personal network was also reflected in the composition of the pair’s campaign team. In contrast to Soetomo, the successful candidate, whose top level of the tim sukses counted no fewer than 126 names, all with close connections to kabupaten Soppeng, Munarfa and Mappatunru only gathered seven people in their tim sukses, most of them former students of theirs, some of whom had no bonds to kabupaten Soppeng whatsoever (KPUD 2005b, 2005c; Mappatunru, pers. comm. 27 March 2006). Given this background, it is not surprising that Munarfa “did not campaign” prior to the 2005 pilkada (Munarfa, pers. comm. 29 March 2006).

Financial concerns of this sort were unknown to Bismirkin, who was by far the richest of all the candidates in kabupaten Soppeng (Tribun 13 Juni 2005). Bismirkin, a businessman, had lived and worked in Jakarta for most of his life. Since he was virtually unknown in Soppeng prior to the pilkada, his personal network was very limited. He also lacked connections to the political establishment of kabupaten Soppeng. He brought together a coalition of eleven minor, cash-strapped parties that were only very weakly rooted in the district. Nine of the parties did not have a seat in the local DPRD (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004; KPUD Soppeng 2005d). In addition to a lack of personal links to the district, Bismirkin was unable to activate any party structures for his own campaign ends, which was reflected in the rather blunt way he campaigned. According to a member of the election monitoring commission (Panwaslu) in Soppeng, Bismirkin distributed motorbikes and televisions to people in the hopes of getting their votes during his short but intense campaign (Mallari, pers. comm. 26 April 2006).

**PILKADA RESULTS IN SOPPENG**

Soetomo won the pilkada with 40 per cent of the total votes (Table 5.2). Soetomo performed strongest in kecamatan Lalabata, the sub-district where he was born, followed by kecamatan Lilirilu, Lilirilu, and Ganra, all sub-districts where Soetomo had worked as village head or sub-district head in the past.17 Harta Sanjaya, the incumbent who won the election in 1999 via the DPRD, only won two of the seven kecamatan, Mario Riwawo and Mario Riawa, two sub-districts where he has close personal relations.18 Munarfa obtained most of his votes in kecamatan Lilirilu, where he even beat the incumbent, Harta Sanjaya. Again, close personal relations might be the explanatory factor as Mappatunru, Munarfa’s running-mate, was born in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dr A Munafzah M, MS and Drs A Rizal Mappatunru, MSi</th>
<th>Drs H Andi Harta Sanjaya and Drs H Syarifuddin Rauf, SH</th>
<th>Drs H Andi Sesto, MSi and Drs Andi Sarimin Saransi</th>
<th>Ir H Bismirkin Manrul and HA</th>
<th>Informal Burhanuddin T, SH, MSi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mario Riawo</td>
<td>2,306</td>
<td>12,409</td>
<td>7,743</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liliriaja</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>9,239</td>
<td>2,669</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lilirilau</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,723</td>
<td>8,550</td>
<td>2,941</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalahata</td>
<td>3,496</td>
<td>7,345</td>
<td>12,880</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganta</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donri-Donri</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>5,489</td>
<td>5,725</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Riawa</td>
<td>3,297</td>
<td>7,245</td>
<td>4,989</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,804</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,386</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,934</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,651</strong></td>
<td><strong>635</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total votes</td>
<td><strong>15.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td><strong>131,400</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Source: KPUD Soppeng 2005.*

**Table 5.2**

2005 Pilkada Voting in Pangkep by Pairs of Candidates and Sub-district

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*kecamatan* Lilirilau (Mappatunru, pers. comm. 27 March 2006; KPUD Soppeng 2005a). Finally, Bismirkin got a small 9 per cent of the total votes in the Soppeng pilkada.

As in Pangkep regency, the candidates' personal networks at the sub-district level seem to have been the decisive factor in winning the pilkada in Soppeng. A seemingly dominant party machine was levered successfully by a figure with a strong personal base in his district, which was the result of two decades of work as a bureaucrat in sub-district positions and an intensive campaign in the villages and hamlets years before the official campaign was to start. The incumbent, though in firm control of the top level of the strongest political party in the district, the bureaucracy, and large parts of the business community, was ousted from power since his personal network did not reach as far down in the kabupaten as the network of his more successful competitor. Finally, similar to kabupaten Pangkep, an affluent businessman who ran for office had limited chances of winning the elections due to the lack of a personal political base at the sub-district level. The vast amounts of money he spent during his campaign did not translate into local votes.
PILKADA IN PANGKEP AND SOPPENG COMPARED

An analysis of the sociological profiles of Syafruddin Nur and Andi Soetomo showed that both were well-grounded in their district. This allowed the two candidates to establish close-knit personal networks, which they capitalized on in the pilkada. Candidates who lacked such a popular base did not win in the pilkada in the districts examined. The incumbents in both districts were somewhat detached from their constituency and mainly interacted with the upper level of the party structures, the bureaucracy, and the business community in their respective districts. Likewise, businessmen who were wealthy, but without a popular base at the sub-district level, stood little to no chance of winning these local elections, as the cases of Fachruddin in Pangkep and Bismirkin in Soppeng showed.

While being downward-oriented now seems to be a necessity for any successful candidate, the nature of the relations to the upper levels in the institutional hierarchies appears to be changing as well. The provincial level these days seems to act more of a facilitator for candidates who derive their power from being rooted in their respective populations rather than acting as a decisive factor in these local elections. This is in contrast to the New Order period in which the governor or the provincial level determined the local government head via the Local Assembly. In other words, while the provincial political arena is used as an additional source of financial support by players from the local political arena, political forces at the provincial level do not seem to be able to actively shape district electoral outcomes any longer. In fact, political players at the provincial level seem to have become more downward-oriented themselves. They are now more eager to provide financial support to popular local figures at the district level as these are figures whose personal networks will be much needed in future direct elections of governors. The current governor of South Sulawesi province, HM Amin Syam, is a striking example of provincial-level figures who have started to establish their own personal networks at sub-provincial levels. Syam, who had already announced in 2005 that he will be running again for the position of governor in the 2007 election (Kompas, 17 December 2005), not only supported candidates in the 2005 pilkada in the districts, but soon after the district elections ended, he created an expert team (tim ahli) at the governor's office. The team consisted of most of the candidates who finished second in the 2005 pilkada in South Sulawesi province.19 It is their extensive personal networks that Syam relied on, in addition to the ones of the successful candidates he supported in the pilkada, to obtain votes in the 2007 gubernatorial elections.
While strong personal networks at the sub-district level seem to have been crucial to win local elections, parties played only a minor role in a candidate's fate. As the pilkada in kabupaten Pangkep and Soppeng demonstrated, parties often could neither provide lower-level party structures to their nominees nor could they guarantee the delivery of votes. This not only holds true for small parties that are largely disintegrated and defunct between elections, but also for seemingly well-integrated parties that received a considerable number of votes in past elections. In kabupaten Pangkep, for example, PPP, the second largest party in the DPRD after pemilu 2004, could not prevent its sub-district constituents from supporting another candidate, as in the case of Fachruddin. Similarly, in kabupaten Soppeng, the leadership of the Golkar party, which was the strongest party in the DPRD after pemilu 2004, could only watch as considerable parts of the party's sub-district levels broke away in favour of another candidate. Furthermore, as the case of Nur in Pangkep showed, even in cases where the candidate had united the party behind him, he did not have unrealistic hopes about the party's actual potential to mobilize voters. Nur, who was nominated by the Golkar party, by far the strongest party in the district according to results from the general election of 2004, nevertheless brought PAN and PKS into his coalition, although he already reached the required 15 per cent threshold by being nominated by Golkar alone. The fact that Nur formed more than a minimum winning coalition exemplifies that he had no false expectations regarding the voter mobilization possible through the Golkar party. In short, for candidates who already have firm roots in their respective districts, strong parties may act as an additional source for yielding results, and weak parties do not necessarily prevent candidates from winning the elections.

Additionally, the election laws of 2004, which required candidates to be nominated by parties provided the latter with a strategic position from which to impose financial demands on the candidates, as already noted elsewhere (Hillman 2006). As the example of Mansur and Tualle showed, prospective candidates without sufficient financial resources do not get nominated. However, the fact that certain candidates are prevented from running for office in the pilkada is the unintended consequence of the parties' financial demands rather than the result of a party strategy of any kind. In other words, as parties demand money from the prospective candidates, they act as early blockers or facilitators by default. Overall, it is important to note that parties only played a minor role in shaping the outcome of the pilkada in the two kabupaten examined in this chapter and that they do not have much power to shape the local contests beyond skimming off candidates early in the electoral process.
Finally, money was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for winning the 2005 pilkada in Pangkep and Soppeng. Running for the post of bupati is an extremely expensive undertaking. Being wealthy does not guarantee a win, however. Affluent candidates without a popular network in the sub-districts did not win the pilkada; such was the case of Fachruddin in Pangkep and Bismirkin in Soppeng. In other words, “money politics” alone did not yield votes in the districts compared in this chapter.

SOUTH SULAWESI AND BEYOND

Many of the observations from the districts examined above find their equivalent in the wider political arena of South Sulawesi and other provinces of the archipelago. Studies on the 2005 pilkada in Batam (Choi 2005), Papua, North Sumatra, North Sulawesi (Mietzner 2006a, b, c, see also his chapter in this volume) and East Sumba (Vel 2005) provide examples and evidence that political figures who were known by the people at the local level successfully won in the 2005 pilkada.

At the same time, seemingly powerful party machines were rendered dysfunctional by individuals with strong personal networks all over South Sulawesi province. This is best shown by the fact that Golkar lost 50 per cent of the elections in South Sulawesi, a region that once was the party’s stronghold (KPU Sulawesi Selatan 2004, 2005). Golkar’s fate in various pilkada of 2005 in the wider political arena of Indonesia provides further evidence of the disintegration of seemingly powerful party machines, as mentioned above. Many district heads of the local Golkar party who were unpopular in their districts clung to their power position within the party and pressed for nomination, subsequently leading the party into defeat. According to a Golkar internal document from April 2006, the party lost 63 per cent of all pilkada in Indonesia in 2005 and 50 per cent of all pilkada carried out in the first four months of 2006 (Golkar DPP 2006).

High-ranking Golkar officials at both the provincial and national levels stated in interviews that they were caught by surprise by the dynamics of the pilkada for which the party was apparently ill-prepared (Parenrengi, pers. comm. 29 March 2006; Rulli, pers. comm. 3 April 2006). According to Rulli, the Golkar party’s Deputy Secretary General, the party missed the opportunity to nominate appropriate figures in many districts. This was seen as a consequence of the national Golkar party’s loss of control over the nomination processes of its local party branches (Rulli, pers. comm. 29 March 2006). How profoundly the dynamics created by the pilkada and described above have impacted on party machines is shown by a statement by
Sumarsono, the Secretary General of the National Golkar Party, made during an interview with a newspaper in March 2006 on the question of why Golkar continues to lose *pilkada* in so many districts:

Why did they [the Golkar candidates] not succeed? Data from our evaluation shows that the candidates who won *pilkada* are those who were known by the people. There were several candidates who didn’t sell themselves properly. Therefore, it is not the party that is the decisive factor in the victory of a candidate. This is a reason to nominate candidates from outside the party who can sell themselves (...) Hence, there are about 6 to 7 people we evaluate. After this, the results are examined. Also, the perception of Golkar in a region is examined in this survey. Are Golkar cadre better [perceived by the population] than figures from outside the party? If there is only a small difference in perceptions, we will go with our cadre. However, if there is a big difference, it is better to nominate a figure from outside the party. (translated from *Fajar*, 31 March 2006).\(^{21}\)

In short, in many districts and provinces across Indonesia, the dynamics created by the *pilkada* have degraded the once dominant Golkar machine to court individuals with strong personal followings in their districts.

As a reaction to the new realities on the ground, the party publicly announced that the old days are over when Golkar party heads could expect to automatically be the Golkar candidate in upcoming elections (*Fajar*, 31 March 2006). At the same time, the central party board in Jakarta is trying to regain control over the local nomination process of the party’s candidates for upcoming *pilkada*. In this vein, the central party board cut back the voting power of the district branches in the nomination process for *pilkada* candidates from 65 per cent down to 20 per cent, as a comparison of the party’s internal voting regulations before and after 2005 *pilkada* shows (Golkar DPP 2005\(^a\), p. 28 Paragraph 1c; Golkar DPP 2005\(^b\), p. 32, Paragraph 5d). This change will allow the party to nominate figures with a popular base in their respective districts instead of detached local Golkar elites if there is a need.

Finally, also in the wider context of South Sulawesi, money seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to win *pilkada*. As a comparison of data on the candidate’s personal wealth with their respective election results shows, it was not the most affluent candidates who won 2005 *pilkada* in most of the districts of South Sulawesi. While businessmen seem to be increasingly able to penetrate the nomination process for elections (Magenda 2005, p. 75), they do not seem to be able — yet — to win these contests to
a similar degree, often due to the lack of a firm rooting in the district in which they are running for office.

**CONCLUSION**

An analysis of the candidates’ socio-economic backgrounds showed that old elites who have their origins in the New Order period were able to maintain their power positions to a great extent. The pilkada imposed new rules on these elites, however, and triggered fierce intra-elite competition at the local level. Some figures within these old elites were better positioned for the interest group realignments that unfolded during the pilkada in 2005, either because of their career background or their ability to anticipate the new dynamics created by direct elections, and thus acted accordingly.

In both districts examined above, it was political figures who were rooted in their districts who won. The fact that many of these candidates were successful in direct local elections but could not win elections via the DPRD in 1999 is an indication that the pilkada increasingly allow people from the lower rungs of the aforementioned old elite to ascend to power. Against this backdrop, it would be too simplistic to argue that the 2005 pilkada outcomes reflect the mere continuation of the New Order status quo in Indonesian local politics. In many cases, the pilkada seem to have indeed brought government closer to the people. Whether this results in more democratic politics remains to be seen.

**Notes**


I would like to thank John T. Sidel and Marcus Mietzner for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter. I am grateful to the Dr Robert and Lina Thylland-Duerr Foundation, the Sir Karl Popper Foundation, the August Weidmann Foundation as well as the Zangger-Weber Foundation in Switzerland whose generous grants made this research possible. Finally, I would like to thank the Freedom Institute in Jakarta for providing me with a desk at their office as well as Endah Asnari for her research assistance.

2 On 23 July 2007, the Constitutional Court overruled this article in the autonomy law, allowing candidates to run in local elections without a party nomination. The debate is ongoing.
In Indonesia overall, 40 per cent of the incumbents were not re-elected (Mietzner 2006a, p. 18).

The candidates provide information about their personal wealth to the KPU. This self-reported data, however, may be incomplete or inaccurate, and has thus to be analysed with caution.


For example, according to Paharuddin Nur, the Vice Chairman (Wakil Ketua) of the Golkar party Pangkep, Syafruddin Nur would pay the costs of the annual festivities to celebrate the founding of Golkar Pangkep or plane tickets for Golkar cadres for travels to Jakarta (Nur, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

Nur’s close links to the contracting industry were apparently established during his time as the head of the Department for Public Works, a government department that carries out transportation and infrastructure work. This position arguably also allowed Nur to accumulate considerable personal wealth given the numerous opportunities for corruption in the infrastructure sector in Indonesia.

Udir, the head of Nur’s campaign team, for example, is the owner of a contracting company and the older brother of Ratna Sari, a member of KPU Pangkep.

The head of KPU Pangkep, Amir Anin, for example, was a long-standing business partner of Patappe. Anin, owning an electricity company, received many lucrative tenders during the time Patappe was governing, such as the project to supply electricity to the islands of kabupaten Pangkep, according to several interviewees.


According to a Golkar member who followed the party internal convention, only Syafruddin Nur and Zenaid Abidin, the former district government head of kabupaten Takalar, were proposed as candidates (Hanaft, pers. comm. 13 March 2006).

In an interview, Fachruddin mentioned that he made several trips to the sub-district heads of PPP Pangkep, on whom a recommendation letter suggesting a prospective candidate to the party centre in Jakarta depends. Fachruddin also met with party representatives at both the provincial and national levels (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006). Meanwhile, Arfan Tualle, the candidate mentioned above, according to his own accounts, was asked for
US$25,000 by the heads of PPP from the party centre for being nominated. Tualle, who expanded the party base considerably in Pangkep in his position as head of the Board for Good Order in the General Election (Bappilu-Badan Pemenangan Pemilu) in 2004, was disappointed that the party centre still asked him for such a large sum of money despite him working for the party’s cause for years (Tualle, pers. comm. 22 April 2006).

Fachruddin stated that he spent “much more” than US$200,000 on his official campaign alone (Fachruddin, pers. comm. 14 March 2006).

Musa, the head of KPUD Soppeng, is Soetomo’s second cousin (Soetomo, pers. comm. 24 March 2006; Musa, pers. comm. 16 March 2006).

In 1999, for example, Soetomo was the head of the Board for the Good Order in the General Election (Bappilu-Badan Pemenangan Pemilu) of the Golkar party Soppeng and “pulled the strings” for the party at the sub-district level for pemilu 2004 (Mallari, pers. comm. 28 March 2006).


Harta Sanjaya was born in Mario Riwao, and Harta Sanjaya’s niece is married to the sub-district head of Mario Riwawo (Mallari, pers. comm. 26 April 2006).

The governor’s “expert team” currently includes figures who lost in 2005 pilkada in kabupaten Selayar, Bulukumba, Maros, Luwu Utara Gowa and Soppeng (Rauf, pers. comm. 27 March 2006).

According to my own interviews with candidates, party heads, DPRD members, and KPUD representatives, a candidate faces costs of US$100,000–300,000 for the party nomination alone. Again, based on personal communications, a conservative estimate of the total costs a candidate in pilkada faces (such as party nomination, campaigning, and reimbursement of tim sukses) is between US$500,000 and US$700,000. This is an average calculated from interview data in the resource-poor districts of South Sulawesi. The prices are undoubtedly much higher in resource-rich kabupaten where the return-on-investment, once a candidate is in office, is likely to be larger. Anecdotal evidence from East Kalimantan, for example, shows that candidates there face minimum costs of about US$700,000 (Pare Pos, 11 June 2005).

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Newspapers and journals

Fajar
Kompas
Pare Pos
Tribun Timur
Since the fall of long-reigning President Soeharto, in 1998, Indonesia has been in an era of transition, away from an authoritarian regime, and on a "quest for democracy". This quest started with decentralization laws implemented in 2001, which gave greater autonomy to the regions, and continued with the direct elections for the national and local legislatures and the President in 2004. The latest development in this democratization process is the implementation of a system for the direct election of regional leaders, which began in 2005; the first round of elections across the nation for all governors, mayors and district heads was completed in 2008. Authors of the chapters in this volume, the result of a workshop in Singapore in 2006, present data from across the archipelago for these first direct elections for local leaders and give their assessment as to how far these elections have contributed to a "deepening democracy".